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ABSTRACT 
STRATEGIC GROUPS, CAPABILITIES, AND PERFORMANCE IN THE U.S. 
BANKING INDUSTRY: A LONGITUDINAL ANALYSIS (1974-1988) 
SEPTEMBER 1992 
AJAY MEHRA, B.COM. PANJAB UNIVERSITY 
M.B.A., PANJAB UNIVERSITY 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY of MASSACHUSETTS 
Directed by: Professor Steven w. Floyd 
This study traces the patterns of competition, strategic 
orientations, and the differential risk/return profiles 
associated with various business strategies in the banking 
industry. It addresses the unresolved questions of strategic 
groups existence, stability, and performance effects by 
examining two contrasting models of strategic group 
formation/identification. It extends the literature 
conceptually by proposing that strategic groups be identified 
using firm resource bundles/capabilities in addition to 
observed product market strategies. Further, it tests an 
expanded model of strategy-performance linkage, and draws 
several empirical implications for the resource based view. 
In the longitudinal facet, using data from the Bank 
Compustat database, eleven scope and resource deployment 
variables were employed to identify strategic groups at the 
corporate strategy level, using a two stage clustering 
algorithm, over a fifteen year period (1974-1988). The impact 
of discontinuous environmental change such as deregulation on 
vi 
strategic group dynamics and firm level risk-return 
relationship was examined. In addition, performance and risk 
differences both across and within groups were investigated. 
In the cross-sectional facet, scores obtained from an expert 
panel of leading bank analysts on ten key resources during 
semi-structured interviews, were used to identify strategic 
groups. 
The study found that strategic groups characterized 
competition in the banking industry both before and after 
deregulation. Some support was found for the underlying 
stability of the strategic groups, despite the profound 
changes characterizing the banking industry. Environmental 
discontinuity was found to enhance inter-group mobility and 
strengthen the negative risk-return relationship prevalent in 
this industry. Across-group performance differences were found 
on economic and risk dimensions, but not on risk-adjusted 
dimensions except in the last time period. Within-group 
performance differences were found, but risk differences 
within groups existed in only 45% of the tests. A model of 
firm performance which included strategic group membership 
along with firm resources was found to have a significantly 
greater explanatory power than a model which omitted firm 
resources. Finally, resource based groupings appeared to be a 
empirically viable representation of industry rivalry and 
these groups were meaningful predictors of economic 
performance. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Few concepts have sparked as much interest and debate 
among strategy researchers as the concept of strategic 
groups. In fact it has become one of the dominant areas of 
empirical research in strategic management (Barney & 
Hoskissen, 1990) . Yet, after twenty years since Hunt (1972) 
originally coined the term strategic groups to describe 
competition in the white goods industry and some thirty odd 
studies later, three fundamental questions regarding the 
existence, stability and performance implications of 
strategic groups remain unresolved. 
The question of existence is largely ontological, and 
intimately tied to the stability and performance issues. To 
substantiate claims that strategic groups are an integral 
part of industry structure requires, longitudinal designs 
demonstrating stable groups and across group performance 
differences. However, out of all the empirical studies to 
date only Oster (1982), Cool (1985), Fiegenbaum (1987), and 
Mascarenhas (1989) tested for the stability of derived 
groupings. This then points to a need for further single 
industry, longitudinal studies to test the existence and 
stability of strategic groups over time. 
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The empirical findings on the performance implications 
of strategic groups are conflicting and extremely confusing 
(Caves & Pugel 1980, Porter 1979, Cool & Schendel 1987, 
Fiegenbaum & thomas 1990) . This could be because most 
studies were data driven (Mcgee & Thomas, 1986), and have 
employed under-specified models to test across group 
performance differences. Alternatively, within group 
performance variance, due to firm level capability 
differences, may have dwarfed across group variation (Cool & 
Schendel, 1988) . In addition, most studies failed to 
carefully operationalize the multifaceted nature of the 
performance construct (Fiegenbaum & Thomas 1990) . 
The linkage of strategic groups and performance is a 
focal point in the strategic groups literature (Caves & 
Porter, 1977; Porter, 1979; Cool & Schendel 1987) . The 
inconclusive empirical evidence on this issue means that 
either no such linkage exists or that the relationship has 
not been captured due to under/poor specification of the 
model. 
Taking the specification issue as paramount, this 
dissertation examines alternative sets of group defining 
variables. In the first model, variables are derived that 
measure scope and resource deployment strategies. Drawing on 
the methodology in Cool (1985) and Fiegenbaum and Thomas 
(1990), these variables are used in a longitudinal analysis 
of strategic groups over the period 1974-1988. Beyond 
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replicating the approach taken in these previous studies, it 
takes advantage of special circumstances in the banking 
industry to examine the effects of discontinuous change 
(i.e. deregulation) on inter-group mobility, and firm level 
risk-return relationships, as well as performances 
differences between and within groups. 
The second model employs resource-based theory 
(Wernerfelt, 1984/ Barney, 1991). Measures of ten 
capabilities are obtained from an expert panel of investment 
analysts and are used in a cross-sectional investigation of 
industry heterogeneity. This analysis explores resource- 
based clusters as a means for specifying strategic groups 
and compares capabilities with scope and resource deployment 
variables in accounting for intraindustry performance 
differences. 
Therefore, this study seeks to conceptually redefine 
the focus of the strategic groups research by exploring a 
contrasting theory of groups which facilitates an evaluation 
of existing approaches to model specification and analysis. 
In addition, it addresses an unresolved and contentious 
debate in the literature by extending the longitudinal 
analysis of strategic groups to the banking industry, 
thereby seeking confirmation for the results in previous 
studies (Cool, 1985; Fiegenbaum, 1987) and, for the first 
time, examining the effects of discontinuous change. 
Finally, it employs measures of firm capabilities along with 
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positioning strategies to comprehensively test the strategy- 
performance linkage. 
Four research questions provide a structure for 
grouping seven hypotheses. They are detailed below: 
1. What are the dynamic patterns of strategic group 
formation and movement over a period of time? What is 
the impact of discontinuous environmental change on 
inter group mobility and firm level risk-return 
relationships? 
2. What is the nature of the relationship between 
strategic group membership and firm performance? 
3. Does the gap between capabilities and strategy account 
for the variation in measures of firm performance? 
4. Are firm resource bundles better predictors of 
strategic group membership than observed product market 
strategies? 
1.1 Outline of the study 
To examine these research questions, this study is 
organized into seven chapters. Chapter II lays down the 
theoretical background of the strategic group and the 
mobility barriers concept. It begins by reviewing the 
existing literature. This reviews culminates by highlighting 
the unresolved questions in this line of enquiry. Then 
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drawing on the resource based view of the firm, an 
alternative view of strategic groups is proposed. 
Chpater III states the research questions and 
hypotheses. An explanation/justification follows each 
question and hypothesis. Chapter IV describes the research 
design and methodology adopted in this study. To enhance 
expositional clarity, the description is broken down into 
the longitudinal facet and the cross-sectional facet. 
Chapter V presents the results of this study, outlining the 
procedures followed for testing individual hypotheses and 
detailing the findings. The chapter ends by discussing the 
limitations of empirical results. 
Chapter VI discusses the results, comparing them 
previous studies, highlighting both similarities and 
differences in the findings, and expounding on the 
significance of the findings for the strategic groups 
research in particular, and strategic management research in 
general. Finally, Chapter VII summarizes the findings and 
details the theoretical and methodological contributions of 
this study to strategy research. The chapter ends by 
discussing the implications of this study for the banking 
industry. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Competition has been the central pillar of research in 
strategic management and arguably its most important 
concern. One of the most important foundations of the 
competitive model that is put into question by theories of 
imperfect competition is that, in order to be considered as 
price takers, the number of agents needs to be sufficiently 
large. In contrast, a situation of oligopoly, in which a 
small number of firms face a large number of buyers, implies 
a strategic interdependence between sellers, such that the 
best policy for a firm will depend on that followed by each 
of its competitors. In this context the anonymity of 
competition disappears, and economic agents become players. 
It is this oligopolistic competitive context which is the 
domain of strategic management, an assumption which is 
rarely explicitly stated. 
Industrial organization economics (10) theory suggests 
that some key structural characteristics condition the 
firm's range of choices of competitive strategy in the 
market (i.e. the firm's conduct). Oligopoly theory seeks to 
clarify and explain the link between structure and conduct 
(firm-to-firm rivalry). Unfortunately, most of the research 
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in 10 tradition has focused on the structure - performance 
link with conduct being solved out as a mere intervening 
variable. The standard Structure - Conduct - Performance 
model of 10 is based on the assumption of homogenous 
industries, and its explanatory power collapses in a sample 
of heterogenous industries. Hatten, Schendel & Copper (1978) 
have warned that industry level models and indiscriminate 
pooling of data leads to results that can easily mislead if 
used at the firm level. Based on their study of brewing 
industry, they conclude: "Generally, a comparison of 
industry versus group-level equations reveals a number of 
instances where the consequences of the business strategies 
followed by specific groups of brewers differ, and certainly 
differ from the "averaging" and perhaps misleading industry 
estimates. Different firms can (and must) use different 
resource deployments to compete successfully" (Hatten, 
Schendel & Cooper, 1978 : 604). The strategic group 
literature within the 10 discipline has evolved from the 
belief that there are more conduct differences between firms 
than just size. (Cool 1985:18). 
2.1 Theoretical Underpinnings 
In this section we dwell on the theoretical rationale 
for the existence of intraindustry heterogeneity and its 
attendant implications. Specifically, we address three 
constructs related to the existence of strategic groups :- 
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(1) mobility barriers, (2) firm performance differences and 
(3) competitive rivalry. The focus is on the utility of 
these constructs for enhancing our understanding of 
competition within industries. 
2.1.1 Early Definition 
The term strategic groups was coined by Michael Hunt 
(1972) in his study of the white goods industry. He found 
that industry participants differed on three key strategic 
dimensions: degree of vertical integration, degree of 
product diversification, and the extent of product 
differentiation. Based on these dimensions he isolated four 
groups: (1) full line national manufacturer's brand 
producers, (2) part line manufacturers' brand producers, (3) 
private brands producers, and (4) national retailers. Hunt 
believed this taxonomy "minimized economic asymmetry in each 
group and revealed barriers to entry to each strategic 
group" (Hunt, 1972:57). He defined strategic groups as : 
"A group of firms within an industry that are highly 
symmetric....with respect to cost structure, degree of 
product diversification ... formal organization, 
control systems, and management rewards and 
punishments ...(and) the personal views and preferences 
for various possible outcomes ...." (Hunt, 1972: 8). 
Newman (1973,1978), in his study of chemical process 
industries identified strategic groups by the relationship 
between the industry at one hand and the activities carried 
out by its member firms outside that industry, on the other 
hand, with firms sharing the same basic business being 
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placed in the same strategic group. He concluded that 
"differing base industries and patterns of vertical 
integration sufficed to stratify rival sellers into 
subgroups" (Newman, 1978 pg.425). He further attempts to 
define strategic groups by noting 
"If corporate strategies can differ persistently among 
direct market rivals, then we can speak of strategic 
groups - each group consisting of firms highly 
symmetric in their corporate strategies as a stable 
element of market structures." 
Full scale theoretical development of the concept was done 
by Porter (1976,1979,1980), who focused on intraindustry 
heterogeneity in the retail distribution industry and 
concluded that "An industry can thus be viewed as composed 
of clusters or groups of firms, where each group consists of 
firms following similar strategies in terms of the key 
decision variables. Such a group could consist of a single 
firm, or could encompass all the firms in the industry. I 
define such groups as strategic groups" (Porter, 1979: 215). 
The presence of strategic groups within an industry was 
expected to affect industry performance through the process 
of competitive rivalry between groups and differential 
barriers to entry between groups. Groups which were 
protected by higher barriers and were relatively insulated 
from the process of competitive rivalry within the industry 
were expected to enjoy superior performance. Firms within a 
strategic group were presumed to recognize their mutual 
dependence much more closely and react similarly to 
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disturbances from outside. Also, since they resemble one 
another quite closely, they are presumed to anticipate one 
another's reactions quite accurately. 
2.1.2 Formation of Strategic Groups 
How do strategic groups form within an industry? Random 
initial differences, differences in firm goals and risk 
profiles and the historical evolution of industry, have been 
identified as factors contributing to the formation of 
strategic groups (Porter, 1979) . Random initial differences 
in assets and skills ensures that some firms outdistance 
others in racing towards the strategic space which is 
maximally protected within an industry. Secondly, different 
firms have different risk and time preferences and since 
investments in mobility barriers are risky (as discussed 
below) , some firms are more prone to making such investments 
than others. 
Finally, the historical evolution of industry such as 
changes in the market growth rate, can facilitate the 
formation of strategic groups. Industries which are 
characterized by high growth may provide an environment for 
firms to attempt different or innovative strategies with 
respect to production or product introduction. Capacity can 
be added profitably more often and in larger increments, 
thus allowing firms to adopt new production technologies 
more quickly. Also, early entry into certain industries 
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provides some entrants with lower costs of adopting some 
strategies than later entrants. On the flip side, the 
irreversibility of many forms of firm investment decisions 
precludes early entrants from adopting certain strategies 
pursued by later entrants, which capitalize on accumulated 
industry learning/wisdom. Thus timing of entry is crucial. 
2.1.3 Common Misconceptions about Strategic Groups 
Let us now look at some of the common misconceptions 
concerning strategic groups. First, strategic groups are 
often confused with market segments (Harrigan,1985). This is 
a fallacy because strategic groups represent a whole 
approach to competing within that segment or arena and not 
just the choice of the arena. Additionally, while strategic 
groups signify heterogeneity on the supply side of the 
market, market segments represent heterogeneity on the 
demand side of the market (Cool 1985) . 
Second, Porter (1979), has warned against the 
misconception implicit in construing strategic groups as a 
redefinition of industry boundaries. Although oligopolistic 
interdependence is recognized more fully within groups than 
between them, it is also recognized more fully within 
industries than between them (Porter, 197 6) . Secondly, 
industry boundaries are delineated by identifying breaks in 
the cross elasticity of supply, and while group products are 
imperfect substitutes in marketing sense (by affecting 
11 
conditions of sale), they are not imperfect substitutes in a 
physical sense. 
Finally, strategic groups are not an extension of 
generic strategies. Generic strategies are more behavioral 
since they represent a strategic posture, while strategic 
groups are more structural and are a fundamental part of 
industry structure. Cool (1985: 109-110) notes: "Whereas 
generic strategy research postulates that there exist 
various types of strategies which are effective in different 
industrial settings, the strategic group concept is based on 
the premise that strategy formation is so industry-specific 
that it is a priori impossible to generalize across 
industries". 
2.1.4 A Contemporary Definition of Strategic Groups 
A strategic group is a relatively stable group of 
competitors that follow similar strategies along key 
strategic dimensions of industry. The nature of key 
strategic dimensions is industry specific depending on the 
fundamental industry structure and changes over time 
according to evolutionary forces (Ramsler 1982). Such 
evolutionary forces may include major innovations in product 
design or marketing methods that affect the current extent 
of product differentiation within the industry. Similarly, 
innovative breakthroughs in processing or transportation 
technologies, input components, or distribution capabilities 
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can alter the various economies of scale or the absolute 
cost factors in the industry, thereby dramatically changing 
the competitive cost structures. 
Additionally, changing demographic characteristics, 
income levels, or buyer tastes and requirements can affect 
the size of the current market or specific segments of the 
market. Change in government regulation or policies can 
rewrite the rules of the game in any competitive arena. 
Therefore, the elements of industry structure are forced to 
undergo continuous change by important evolutionary changes. 
Such change has a direct influence on the conduct of firms 
within the industry and on the nature of their competitive 
interaction. 
Thus, strategic groups are a useful tool for dynamic 
modeling of industry evolution, in which firms with 
different strategies and different objectives make 
investments in improving their strategic position. Strategic 
group mapping can be a useful way of tracking industry 
dynamics as firms become more similar to or different from 
each other. "The matching of market segment changes with 
strategic group evolutions provides a useful means of 
predicting the nature of competition" (Harrigan, 1985) . In 
this context then, strategic groups can help managers to 
focus their attention upon differences in how competitors 
approach the market place. It can help them to assess 
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- The attractiveness of market opportunities for their 
firm (and for their competitors); 
- Their ability to exploit industry changes; 
- And hence, their long term opportunities for 
profitability within the industry in question. 
2.2 Mobility Barriers 
Mobility barriers are at the heart of strategic groups 
theory. If strategic groups are present within an industry 
then there have to be mobility barriers in that industry and 
conversely if there are intraindustry barriers to changing 
strategic posture, the industry can be said to consist of 
strategic groups (Mcgee & thomas, 1986) . The concept of 
mobility barriers was first advanced by Caves & Porter 
(1977) wherein they argued that theory of entry "becomes 
much richer-yet remains determinate - when set forth as a 
general theory of the mobility of firms among segments of an 
industry, thus encompassing exit and inter-group shifts as 
well as entry" (Caves & Porter, 1977: 242). 
In general, mobility barriers are structural or 
strategic barriers which surround a group and protect it 
from entry by potential rivals. Thus they provide a dual 
protection against entry by new competitors into the 
industry and from the threat of entry by incumbents in other 
groups moving into the group in question. But, these same 
protective barriers can act as traps or exit barriers. 
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blocking either de novo exit from the industry or simply 
inter group movement. This was empirically demonstrated by 
Harrigan (1980) in her study of declining businesses and 
Mascarenhas & Aaker (1989) in their study of the oil 
drilling rig industry. The height of mobility barriers 
surrounding a group varies from group to group, with some 
groups enjoying protection with much stronger and higher 
barriers than others. This then provides an explanation for 
persistent intraindustry profit differences and for the 
choice of different strategies. 
What factors give rise to mobility barriers? Joe Bain 
(1956) identified three sources of barriers in an industry 
in his general theory of entry. These are economies of 
scale, product differentiation, and capital 
requirements/absolute cost advantages of established firms. 
These standard sources of entry barriers can vary with the 
group and therefore translate into mobility barriers. For 
example, in a given industry some firms spend large sums of 
money on advertising and sales promotions to create a strong 
brand name for their products enabling them to charge 
premium prices, while others eschew such outlays and sell 
their products at low prices or unbranded. 
Therefore, the extent of product differentiation often 
varies within an industry, and with it, the level of 
product-differentiation barriers to entry. Similarly, 
absolute cost barriers will be higher in the group of firms 
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engaged in full-line production because of the greater 
capital outlay requirements and in groups defined by 
extensive vertical integration for the same reason. Again, 
because the groups' mixture of activities differ, their 
operative cost curves are not identical, and therefore, 
scale-economy barriers can vary among groups. In fact, 
scale-economy barriers provide an explanation for why 
entrants could rationally choose suboptimal scales when 
larger and lower cost sellers are present (Caves & Porter, 
1977) . 
Mcgee (1985) and Mcgee & Thomas (1986) have identified 
three sources of mobility barriers: market related 
strategies which is akin to Bain's product differentiation, 
industry supply characteristics (the equivalent of Bain's 
economies of scale) and characteristics of the firm (an 
extension of Bain's absolute cost advantages and includes 
things like organization structure control systems and 
ownership). Twenty-one sources of mobility barriers are 
identified in Table 2.1. These are divided into three 
categories: economic (intrinsic), strategic and firm 
specific. 
This classification, represents a comprehensive 
treatment of sources of mobility barriers. It should be 
noted that calculation of the height of these mobility 
barriers is still a "black art" (Shepherd, 1988) and 
moreover, it is not clear how these various sources combine, 
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whether multiplicative or additive, to determine the 
height/strength of mobility barriers. 
Investments in the creation of mobility barriers are 
risky in so far as the costs are irrevocable and change the 
overall cost make up of the group. While resale markets may 
exist for capital equipment and tangible assets, it is hard 
to recover differentiation costs or investments in R & D. 
Similarly, if the creation of mobility barriers increases 
the fixed cost component of the groups' overall costs then 
it increases the groups' susceptibility to changes the in 
environment (i.e., its riskiness). 
A related notion is that there are significant costs 
associated with inter-group mobility along with a time lag. 
Oster (1982: 238) notes, " At the heart of the strategic 
groups theory is the idea that there are rigidities 
associated with change". This means that any strategic group 
scheme based on mobility barriers, should be relatively 
stable over time. If substantial mobility is observed 
between groups, then one can question the presence of 
mobility barriers and the validity of strategic groups, in 
absence of clear evidence of barrier lowering investments by 
firms. Excessive mobility then should be evidence that 
strategic groupings have not been identified (Mascarenhas & 
Aaker, 1989) . 
Mobility barriers represent for the group members an 
investment in a collective, sometimes intangible, capital 
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asset whose benefits are shared between group members (Mcgee 
1985). Firms' shares of the rents from this collectivity 
will probably be in proportion to their share of sales 
(Caves & Porter 1977) . However, in absence of collusion, 
the level and design of these investments will be tailored 
by individual firms to yield them the maximum share of the 
incremental joint profit stream. This would then give rise 
to Hatten and Hatten's (1987) notion of asymmetrical 
mobility barriers. The challenge for strategists then is to 
create entry barriers into one's own group while reducing 
exit barriers, and to recognize that different barriers may 
be needed to keep out potential competitors from 
differentially positioned groups. 
2.3 Strategic Groups and Firm Performance 
Strategic groups are extremely useful for investigating 
intra industry profit differences. According to Porter 
(1979) "The concept of strategic groups allows us to 
systematically integrate differences in the skills and 
resources of an industry's member firms and their consequent 
strategic choices into a theory of profit determination." 
In their early work. Caves and Porter (1977) focused 
exclusively on the performance consequences of strategic 
group membership. They emphasized entry barriers, collusion 
and market power at the group level and suggested a strong 
association between group membership and firm performance, 
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with firms occupying groups protected by the highest 
mobility barriers enjoying superior performance. Porter 
(1979, 1980) in his later work, significantly shifted his 
focus from group level performance to firm level 
performance. He contended that consideration of market 
factors, as well as firm-specific factors, would enhance 
performance predications over those based on mobility 
barrier considerations alone. 
While mobility barriers still occupied a central place 
in the determination of firm performance. Porter argued that 
differences of scale, risk profile, asset endowments and the 
ability to execute a chosen strategy among group members 
significantly moderated the linkages between mobility 
barriers and firm performance. 
However, empirical research (Cool & Schendel 1987, 
Frazier & Howell 1983, Porter 1979, Dess & Davis 1984 among 
others) continued to focus on establishing across group 
performance differences and produced mixed results. 
As pointed out by Cool & Schendel (1988), the huge 
within-groups variance of performance among group members 
might have dwarfed the between-groups variance and thus may 
account for inconsistent findings. This line of thinking 
focuses on capability management and isolating mechanisms at 
the firm level. It challenges the assumption that group 
members are very similar (i.e., incumbents equally share 
profits). Two empirical studies in this direction have come 
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out with significant findings. Lawless, Wilsted & Bergh 
(1988) in their multi-industry study of 55 manufacturing 
firms broadly divided into two groups, find significant 
performance differences among firms within groups. This is 
attributed to differences in firm capabilities as shown by a 
significant correlation between firm capabilities and 
performance. Cool and Schendel (1988) in a study of the 
pharmaceutical industry divided the industry into 5 groups 
and found significant performance differences among group 
members within groups which were attributed to firms' risk 
profiles and accumulated asset endowments (broadly, firm 
capabilities or competencies). 
Hence, strategists should bear in mind that simply 
being a member of the maximally protected group within an 
industry, or shifting to one, is no guarantee of superior 
performance. Unless firms possess deep firm-embodied skills 
to implement the "superior" product market strategies and 
their asset bases are aligned with their strategic 
postures, the firm will not be able to extract economic 
rents. Again, where their is intense rivalry among the 
members of the dominant group, rents would be competed away. 
Summarizing, it may be said that an understanding of 
firm performance determinants is enriched by employing the 
strategic groups framework and that the strategic groups 
concept holds considerable promise for studying and 
predicting differential performance of industry members. 
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2.4 Strategic Groups and Competitive Rivalry 
Oligopoly theory predicts that collusion by 
oligopolists on restricting output or price fixing enables 
oligopolists to exercise market power - the ability to hold 
price above marginal cost, so that they can earn abnormal 
profits. Oligopolists may collude overtly or they may employ 
facilitating devices to collude tacitly and maximize joint 
profits. The more concentrated the market, the more 
standardized the product, the more comparable the costs and 
rates of time preference across firms, the more likely 
oligopolists are to reach an agreement (Stigler, 1964) . 
But the presence of heterogenous strategic groups 
complicates oligopolists agreement on a common set of market 
goals and reduces the degree of adherence to a tacit 
agreement. Additionally, while oligopolists as a group will 
always have an incentive to collude, oligopolists as 
individuals will always have an incentive to cheat on a 
collusive agreement (Stigler, 1964) . The presence of 
divergent strategic groups with less common interaction via 
common customers, suppliers, and channels of distribution, 
restricts the mutual flow of information, thereby reducing 
the ability to rapidly detect cheating and hence undermining 
the stability of tacit agreement. Newman (1978 :418) notes, 
"If firm membership in different strategic groups can signal 
differences in their market goals and reflexes, it is clear 
that an industry with a more complex structure of strategic 
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groups should (ceteris paribus) display more rivalrous 
conduct". 
Porter (1979) has identified three factors which 
explain the intensity of rivalry within an industry: (i) the 
number and size distribution of groups, (ii) the degree of 
market interdependence and (iii) the strategic distance 
between groups. Discussion of each of these is organized 
around the following questions: 
(1) How does the configuration of strategic groups 
influence rivalry ? 
(2) How do changes in the make-up of strategic groups 
affect rivalry ? 
(3) Are all strategic groups equally potent in 
influencing industry rivalry ? 
(4) How is one group affected by rivalry with other 
groups ? 
2.4.1 Configuration of Groups 
The configuration of strategic groups consists of the 
number and size distribution of strategic groups within an 
industry (where size is equal to the aggregate market shares 
of group members), the market interdependence between groups 
- the extent to which different groups compete for the same 
customers, and the strategic distance - the degree of 
strategic asymmetry between groups. Where the industry 
consists of few groups of more or less equal size, the 
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potential for rivalry in terms of price or non-price 
competition is much greater, therefore the chances of tacit 
collusion are much higher. 
On the other hand, where the industry is populated by a 
large number of groups of unequal size, it is extremely 
difficult to work out any collusive agreement and much more 
difficult to enforce such a agreement. Moreover, it is 
anticipated that the greater the distance among strategic 
groups, the less their mutual interdependence, and more 
difficult will be any tacit collusion among them. Therefore, 
it is more likely that a strong rivalry will exist in such a 
industry. 
Finally, market interdependence can work both ways. It 
may be expected that with a high level of interdependence, 
competition will not only be intense but also varied in 
form, reflecting the diverse asset structures of 
competitors. On the other hand, a high level of 
interdependence can force the rivals to come to the 
bargaining table and work out some kind of an agreement. The 
key seems to be the strategic distance and the relative 
sizes of the groups competing for the same market. Where 
there is a great diversity in the strategic postures of 
these interdependent groups of unequal sizes, the 
possibility of any tacit collusion is extremely remote and 
the rivalry should be at its fiercest, while less strategic 
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distances among equal sized interdependent groups will help 
to tone down the degree of rivalry. 
2.4.2 Changes in Group Membership 
The make-up of strategic groups and changes in 
membership over time provides us a window into the 
historical patterns of competition within an industry. 
Essentially, analyzing membership forces the researcher to 
look at the specific structure of each group. Where groups 
are composed of unequal sized firms, scale differences work 
to the advantage of large firms when economies of scale or 
captive distribution arrangements are present (Porter,1979). 
Similarly, entry of a vertically integrated player from 
an adjacent industry could severely disrupt the stability of 
any existing agreement among group members or across groups, 
thereby leading to an increase in rivalry. This occurs 
because a vertically integrated producer can indirectly 
shade the cartel price (if there is an price agreement) if 
it in operates in downstream industries. A classic example 
is OPEC, where by integrating forward into refining and 
distribution, many OPEC nations have acquired the ability to 
cut the price of crude oil discreetly. Further, where the 
costs of mobility into the group differs among group 
members, their risk and time preferences are likely to vary, 
making it difficult to enforce any collusive agreement and 
therefore increasing competition within the groups. 
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2.4.3 Group Power 
All strategic groups are not equally potent in 
influencing industry rivalry. The key is to focus on the 
most protected group or the one surrounded by highest 
mobility barriers (Porter,1979). In a sense, this is the 
dominant group in the industry. The firms within this group 
will fully recognize their interdependence and therefore, 
are likely to hold price while competing on other variables 
or investments in entry deterrence. This would then provide 
a 'price umbrella' for other groups, even though profits 
were competed away in the protected group. This 'price 
umbrella' while assuring superior profits for less protected 
groups (provided they control mutual rivalry), also shifts 
the overall pattern of competition within the industry. 
2.4.4 Industry Rivalry 
Finally, the effect of inter-group rivalry is dependent 
on the mobility barriers surrounding groups. The group with 
the higher barriers has a greater profit potential, if the 
competition within the group is not strong. But, the 
outbreak of competitive warfare in this group is likely to 
spill over into adjacent groups through market 
interdependence, forcing them to respond and thereby, 
competing away the profits of both the groups. Similarly, 
where one group enters into a new wage agreement with its 
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labor unions, it is going to alter the cost structures of 
surrounding groups. 
2.5 Empirical Studies 
Early work (Newman 1978, Porter 1979, Caves & Pugel 
1980, Oster 1982, Greening 1980, Hatten & Schendel 1977) 
following Hunt's (1972) research was chiefly concerned with 
identifying intra industry heterogeneity and establishing 
that firms in an industry differed in more important 
respects than just size. This was appropriate since, in 
effect, it amounted to proving that firm conduct could 
affect industry structure and consequently performance in 
important ways. 
But, still strategic groups remained only a "sort of 
dynamized add on to the S-C-P paradigm" (Caves, 1984) . The 
presence of strategic groups within an industry was expected 
to affect industry performance through the process of 
competitive rivalry between groups and differential barriers 
to entry between groups. Groups which were protected by 
higher barriers and were relatively insulated from the 
process of competitive rivalry within the industry, were 
expected to enjoy superior performance. 
Later work in this stream of research focused on 
testing the performance implications of the strategic group 
membership. However, the few empirical findings on this 
differential performance hypothesis are conflicting. Porter 
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(1979), comparing the performance of his "leader" and 
"follower" strategic groups, stated that leader groups 
outperform followers. However, the difference found was not 
statistically significant. Neither did Caves and Pugel 
(1980) find a difference in profitability between smaller 
and larger firms. Oster (1982), on the other hand, found 
that high advertisers outperformed low advertisers in those 
industries where advertising spending has lasting effects. 
Howell and Frazier (1983) found no difference in performance 
among their strategic groups in the medical supply and 
equipment industry, while Dess and Davis (1984) observed 
that their "generic" strategic groups in the paint and 
allied products industry differed on some performance 
measures while not on others. 
Cool (1985) in his doctoral dissertation, while 
reviewing the strategic group research, classified the 
literature into strategic management based studies and I.O. 
based studies. His rationale for doing so was that I.O. 
based studies were more concerned with the issues of 
industry rivalry and performance and paid lesser attention 
to the empirical implementation of the concept, while 
studies of strategic groups grounded in the strategic 
management tradition were concerned with an analysis of firm 
conduct per se and operationalized the group concept in a 
more systematic manner. 
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However, following Hatten & Hatten (1987), this 
distinction merely reflects the usage of bivariate 
classificatory schemes employed by the former, versus the 
multivariate classification of the latter, to identify 
strategic groups. The distinctions among the two alleged 
streams of research highlighted by Cool (1985), although 
useful, do not represent fundamental paradigmatic 
differences, so as to warrant separate reviews. 
Strategic group literature is largely empirical in its 
orientation. This empirical work can be best classified by 
differentiating between the basis used for strategic group 
identification. Most studies have employed similarities in 
the observed strategic behavior or conduct of the firms to 
identify strategic groups within industries. This approach 
can be further broken down into bivariate classification 
schemes and multivariate classification schemes. The 
bivariate studies are conducted in spirit of original 
Harvard studies on groups (Hunt 1972, Newman 1973, Porter 
1973) and use a much narrower operationalization of 
strategy. Groups are typically identified by using one or 
two (upto four) variables such as size, advertising 
intensity, vertical integration, R&D expenditures, 
geographic origin etc. These studies generally employ large, 
cross-sectional sampling frames encompassing several 
industries. 
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The multivariate studies are conducted in the spirit of 
the original Purdue studies on the Brewing industry 
(Schendel, Hatten & Cooper 1978/ Hatten & Schendel 1977/ 
Hatten, Schendel & Cooper 1978) and employ a much richer and 
broader operationalization of strategy. These are 
essentially single industry studies and use multiple 
strategic variables (marketing, finance, manufacturing, 
operations etc.), which capture the key bases of competition 
in the industry, to identify strategic groups. 
The second approach to group identification is the use 
of mobility barriers. This is a relatively recent, but 
promising, approach. The argument here is that since 
mobility barriers represent the theoretical core of the 
concept and deter movement between groups, they should be 
the relevant basis for group identification. Proponents of 
this approach argue that mobility barrier based groups 
provide a very different conceptual focus than a common 
strategy conceptualization of strategic groups because 
mobility barriers are resource dependent and are driven by 
firm assets and skills (Mascarenhas & Aaker 1989). 
The last approach to group identification is the use of 
the capital asset pricing model of finance theory. In this 
approach, firms whose security returns are correlated are 
put into the same group. Although the idea is interesting, 
there is only one study (Ryans & Wittink 1985) of this type 
in the literature. 
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Table 2.2 provides a detailed summary of empirical 
strategic groups studies in terms of choice of variables, 
sample frame, data analytic method and findings. A 
comprehensive review of the strategic group literature is 
available in Cool (1985) and Mcgee & Thomas 1986). 
2.6 Unsettled Questions 
Despite this plethora of research which the strategic 
groups concept has spawned, three fundamental questions 
pertaining to this stream of research remain largely 
unsettled and are subject to considerable debate among the 
scholars in the field. (1) Are strategic groups an integral 
part of an industry structure or are they mere statistical 
artifacts? (2) What are the performance implications of 
strategic group membership? (3) How stable are these group 
structures over time? It is interesting to note that the 
first question concerning the definition/identification of 
the groups essentially drives the other two. In the 
following paragraphs, we elaborate on each of these issues. 
2.6.1 Existence of Strategic Groups 
The question of existence involves both methodological 
and conceptual issues. The standardized methodologies 
employed for discovering strategic groups in an industry 
such as clustering or other data reduction techniques are 
inherently biased in favor of uncovering clusters of data 
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from a large data set. But this amounts to creating rather 
than discovering natural structures, since the underlying 
assumption is that these groupings do in fact exist (Barney 
& Hoskisson 1990). 
In a review of 27 studies, Barney and Hoskisson (1990) 
found that all of them including the multi-industry studies 
of Harrigan (1980: 8 industries) and Hergert (1983: 50 
industries), found the presence of strategic groups within 
industries. Barney and Hoskisson (1990:7) observe that "the 
development of clusters, per se, cannot be used as a test of 
the existence of strategic groups. In this analytic 
approach, strategic group theorists are left in the 
uncomfortable position of assuming that strategic groups 
exist, applying algorithms that are guaranteed to generate 
clusters, and then concluding that the obtained clusters 
demonstrate that strategic groups exist. The tautology here 
is obvious". 
These empirical limitations however, do not negate the 
concept of strategic groups. On a conceptual level, it is 
important to develop a theory of strategic groups which will 
predict the presence, as well as the absence, of strategic 
groups, depending upon the conditions in the industry. Also, 
it is important to empirically establish the existence of 
strategic groups in as many industries as possible 
(Galbraith & Schendel, 1983). The validity of these 
groupings then needs to be confirmed with managers so as to 
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determine whether the findings corroborate the perceived 
natural groupings in the industry. 
2.6.2 Strategic Groups and Performance 
The question of performance is directly linked with 
correct identification of strategic groups in the industry. 
It may be argued that the data driven nature of most 
strategic group studies has led to invalid identification of 
strategic groups, and consequently, has failed to 
unequivocally establish performance differences across 
groups. Another contributory factor may be the huge within 
groups variance, which would dwarf across group performance 
differences (Cool & Schendel 1988) . Further, almost all 
studies, except the most recent ones, employed unitary 
measures of performance. These measures fail to capture the 
multifaceted nature of the performance construct (Fieganbaum 
& Thomas, 1990). 
Despite all these moderating explanations, it is 
important to clearly establish the linkage between strategic 
groups and performance. Thomas and Venkatraman (1988: 541) 
note that "if strategic groups are to be truly useful for 
theory construction in strategic management, then there 
should be a relationship between strategic group membership 
and performance criteria". 
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2.6.3 Stability of Strategic Groups 
Except for Oster (1982), Cool (1985), Fiegenbaum 
(1987), and Mascarenhas (1989), strategic group studies have 
not checked for the stability of derived groups over time. 
Most studies really have been snapshots in time. This is 
particularly worrisome, given the fact any claim of 
strategic groups being a fundamental part of industrial 
reality is unsubstantiated till the stability of these 
groupings is established. Further, along with temporal 
stability, the stability across variations in the dimensions 
used to develop the structure of strategic groups also needs 
to be established. For example, what would happen to the 
groups if we added or subtracted a strategy variable used 
for grouping analysis? 
The above discussion highlights the ambiguous and 
equivocal nature of existing research regarding, the 
questions of existence, stability, and performance 
implications of the strategic groups. In conclusion, it may 
be said that we need a new way of thinking about the 
theoretical rationale for the existence of intraindustry 
heterogeneity and its attendant implications, so as to 
address the weaknesses of extant literature on the subject. 
A preliminary attempt is made towards this end by 
developing a resource/skill based model of strategic groups 
that draws on the emerging, resource based theory of the 
firm. The model calls for identifying strategic groups based 
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on the accumulated asset endowments of the incumbents or the 
resource bundles employed to compete by the industry 
participants, rather than on the basis of their product 
market strategies. 
2.7 An Alternative View of Strategic Groups 
Under the new realties of global competition, 
traditional strategic recipes no longer hold. Successful 
competitors build their strategies not around products but 
around deep knowledge of a few highly developed core skills 
(Hamel & Prahalad 1989) . The management focuses on what it 
does best, avoids distractions, and leverages its 
organizational and financial resources far beyond what 
traditional strategies allow. Quinn et al (1990:60) argue 
that "now physical facilities - including a seemingly 
superior product - seldom provide a sustainable competitive 
edge. They are too easily bypassed, reverse engineered, 
cloned, or slightly surpassed. Instead, a maintainable 
advantage usually derives from outstanding depth in selected 
human skills, logistics capabilities, knowledge bases, or 
other service strengths that competitors cannot reproduce 
and that lead to greater demonstrable value for the 
customer". 
As the above discussion illustrates, the underlying 
bases of competition has shifted from being more asset based 
to being more skill based. Therefore, any viable study of 
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competitive patterns within an industry should concentrate 
on isolating underlying skills employed by firms to compete. 
Additional support for this line of thinking is provided by 
Mcgee and Thomas (1989: 105): 
"We maintain that among the set of distinctive assets 
in which a firm can invest are 'marketing' assets, i.e. 
those abilities of the firm to perceive, interpret, and 
respond to customer characteristics in such a way that 
rivals find it difficult and costly to replicate such 
behavior - thus, mobility barriers are created. In our view 
such barriers can be created in any sphere of the firm's 
operations. To discuss pricing (for example) on its own is 
less useful than examining how distinctive firm-level 
characteristics (which are embodied in different asset 
structures) influence competitive forces", (emphasis added) 
These abilities and distinctive firm level 
characteristics which Mcgee and Thomas label as distinctive 
assets are what Aaker (1989) has termed as skills, defined 
as something that you do better than your competition. This 
label is more descriptive since these are intangible. These 
skills are the result of tangible underlying investments in 
assets, accumulated over a period of time. 
The precise pattern of accumulation may vary from a 
firm to firm. A specific skill, then, is developed by a 
pattern of investments which a creates a distinctive asset 
structure or a skill. Of themselves, skills have no value 
both in input as well as output markets. Skills are firm 
specific and are acquired and nurtured over a long period of 
time with a deliberate strategic focus. Skills have an 
economic value only when they are employed with some 
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combination of assets to implement chosen product market 
strategies. 
A sample portfolio of skills may consist of knowledge 
about special product designs, advanced process 
technologies, innovative marketing and distribution methods, 
appropriate organizational structures, administrative 
procedures, etc. which the firm has acquired over a period 
of time. In any industry, successful players build their 
product market strategies around one or some combination of 
these skills. 
The underlying competitive advantage, then, is provided 
by these skills, which also circumscribe the competitive 
flexibility of firms in terms of their ability to change 
their strategic postures. Also, while specific strategic 
postures might vary among a group of firms, it is possible 
that they will derive their underlying competitive strength 
from the same set of skills. For example, there might be a 
group of firms within an industry which compete in the 
marketplace based on their skills in efficient manufacturing 
or their marketing competencies etc. 
Thus, it may be inferred that systematic differences 
exist between firms as a result of 'strategic' resource 
choices, i.e. decisions to invest in building skills which 
are often difficult and costly to imitate. These skills then 
constitute the primary source of competitive advantage. 
Competitive differentiation is sustained by deploying a 
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combination of assets and skills, since as argued above 
skills deployed by themselves create no economic value. 
The combination of assets and skills is called a 
resource bundle or resource mix. The larger the proportion 
of skills in this bundle/mix, the more complex, less 
imitable and consequently more valuable it is. This can be 
understood by using an analogy from the construction 
industry where a mixture of cement and sand is used to make 
a plaster which then is used to fortify the brick structure 
of houses. The higher the percentage of cement in the 
mixture the stronger the resulting building. The cement in 
this example is akin to skills while the sand is akin to 
assets in our model. 
The resulting resource bundle, then, is at the heart of 
a firms' strategic capabilities and thrusts. These resource 
bundles are the drivers of successful product market 
strategies. While superior performing product market 
strategies are transparent to every player in the industry, 
what is not so readily apparent is the resource base 
required to successfully implement those strategies. Even if 
such insights are obtainable, considerable time lag is 
required to acquire and cultivate the desired resource mix. 
Effective competition then occurs not at level of observed 
product market strategies (which merely reflects transient 
competitive positioning), but at the level of 
acquisition/creation of suitable resource bundles. 
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Any derivation of strategic groups based only on 
observed product market strategies would fail to capture 
this underlying competitive reality. It is the complexity of 
underlying resource bundles which sustain the firms' 
competitive advantage and prevents effective imitation of 
its strategies. These resource mixes are akin to notions of 
uncertain imitability and isolating mechanisms (Lippman & 
Rumelt 1982, Nelson & Winter 1982) and provide effective 
means of identifying strategic groups. Support for this line 
of thinking is found in Mcgee & Thomas (1986: 154) who state 
that - " Rumelt's isolating mechanisms therefore provide a 
basis for identifying groups on the basis of similar 
clusters of isolating mechanisms on the grounds that they 
are the phenomena which make competitive positions stable 
and defensible, given the uncertainty arising from 
unexpected changes in the environment". 
Strategic groups, therefore, may be defined as groups 
of firms which compete within an industry by deploying 
similar resource bundles. Focusing on the isolation of 
resource combinations of the firm rather than its 
identifiable product market strategic posture can be 
understood by borrowing from the Systems Theory concept of 
equifinality. Katz and Kahn (1978:30) describe equifinality 
as follows: "According to this principle, a system can reach 
the same final state from differing initial conditions and 
by a variety of paths". Projected to the strategy context. 
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this notion implies that identical goal sets can be attained 
by different resource combinations. However, since some of 
the resource combinations are inherently more efficient than 
others, economic rents will accrue to firms employing 
superior combinations. This will then translate into 
performance differences between firms following similar 
strategies or "within groups variance". But if strategic 
groups are identified based on similarities in patterns of 
resource deployments rather than derived product market 
strategies, such confounding effects may not occur. 
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Table 2.1 Sources of mobility barriers 
A) Economic (Intrinsic) causes of barriers. 
1. Capital Requirements related to plant and firm size, 
and to capital intensity. 
2. Economies of Scale (from both technical and pecuniary 
causes) 
3. Product differentiation (occurring naturally among 
products) 
4. Absolute Cost advantages (from many possible causes, 
including differential wage rates) 
5. Diversification (giving the possibility of massing and 
redeploying resources among branches) 
6. Research and Development Intensity. 
7. High Durability of Firm-Specific Capital (giving rise 
to sunk costs) 
8. Vertical Integration (which may require entry to occur 
on two levels at once). 
B) Strategic Causes of Barriers: 
1. Retaliation and Pre-emptive actions (by the use of 
price or other devices) 
2. Excess Capacity (as a basis for effective retaliation 
or for threats of retaliation) 
3. Selling Expenses Including Advertising (to increase the 
degree of product differentiation) 
4. Patents (which provide exclusive control over 
technology) 
5. Control over Other Strategic Resources (such as ores, 
locations, specific talents, etc.) 
6. "Packing the Product Space" (in industries with high 
product differentiation, as in the US cereals industry) 
continued on next page 
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Table 2.1 continued 
C) Firm-Specific Factors: 
1. Shared visions/culture. 
2. Installed base of satisfied customers. 
3. Reputation for Quality. 
4. Customer Orientation/Services and Product Support. 
5. Continuing Product Innovation. 
Adapted from Shepherd (1988) . 
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CHAPTER III 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
The lack of uniformity among various strategic group 
studies makes it difficult to bring a cumulative research 
perspective to this stream of literature (Thomas & 
Venkatraman, 1988) . Despite the rich theoretical traditions 
from which strategic group theory emerged and the numerous 
empirical efforts to test its implications, three 
fundamental questions related to existence, stability and 
performance implications of strategic groups remain largely 
unresolved. 
While the question of existence is largely ontological, 
the question of stability has only been examined by four 
(Oster 1982, Cool 1985, Fiegenbaum 1987, Mascarenhas 1989) 
out of the thirty odd empirical studies on strategic groups. 
This, then, points to a need for further single industry, 
longitudinal studies to test the existence and stability of 
strategic groups over time. 
The linkage of strategic groups and performance is a 
focal point in the strategic group literature (Caves & 
Porter 1977, Porter 1979, Cool & Schendel 1987, McGee & 
Thomas 1986). In fact, Thomas and Venkatraman (1988: 541) 
note that "if strategic groups are to be truly useful for 
theory construction in strategic management, then there 
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should be a relationship between strategic group membership 
and performance criteria". However, the inconclusive 
empirical evidence on this issue means that either no such 
linkage exists or that the relationship has not been 
captured due to under/poor specification of the model. McGee 
& Thomas (1986: 149) note that "the drive for quantification 
does seem to have overshadowed the pressing, prior need to 
adequately specify the model and the variables being 
addressed". 
Taking the specification issue as paramount, this 
dissertation examines alternative sets of group defining 
variables. In the first model, variables are derived that 
measure scope and resource deployment strategies. Drawing on 
the methodology in Cool (1985) and Fiegenbaum and Thomas 
(1990), these variables are used in a longitudinal analysis 
of strategic groups over the period 1974 to 1988. Beyond 
replicating the approach taken in previous studies (Cool & 
Schendel, 1987/ Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1990), it takes 
advantage of special circumstances in the banking industry 
to examine the effects of discontinuous change (i.e. 
deregulation) on inter-group mobility, risk-return 
relationships, as well as performance differences between 
and within groups. 
The second model employs resource-based theory 
(Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney 1991) . Measures of ten 
capabilities are obtained from an expert panel of investment 
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analysts and are used in a cross-sectional investigation of 
industry heterogeneity. This analysis explores resource- 
based clusters as a means for specifying strategic groups 
and compares capabilities with scope and resource deployment 
variables in accounting for intraindustry performance 
differences. 
Therefore, this study seeks to conceptually redefine 
the focus of the strategic groups research by exploring a 
contrasting theory of groups which facilitates an evaluation 
of existing approaches to model specification and analysis. 
In addition, it addresses an unresolved and contentious 
debate in the literature by extending the longitudinal 
analysis of strategic groups to the banking industry, 
thereby seeking confirmation for the results in previous 
studies (Oster, 1982/ Cool, 1985; Fiegenbaum, 1987/ 
Mascarenhas, 1989) and, for the first time, examining the 
effects of discontinuous change. Finally, it employs 
measures of firm capabilities along with positioning 
strategies to comprehensively test the strategy-performance 
linkage. Four research questions provide a structure for 
grouping seven hypotheses. 
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3.1 Dynamic Characteristics of Strategic Groups 
Q1.) What are the dynamic patterns of strategic group 
formation and movement over a period of time? What is the 
impact of discontinuous environmental change on inter group 
mobility and firm level risk-return relationships? 
This question seeks to examine the stability of derived 
strategic groups and whether some groups are more stable 
than others. Investigation of the stability of identified 
groupings is fundamental to any strategic groups study 
because, as Mascarenhas and Aaker (1989) have pointed out, 
excessive mobility between groups indicates that meaningful 
groupings have not been identified. A dynamic perspective is 
employed to uncover whether changes in strategic group 
membership occur, and if so, what patterns can be observed 
in the membership changes. 
Strategic group dynamics are associated with three 
different outcomes: a change in group strategy, a change in 
group membership, or a change in the number of groups 
(Mascarenhas, 1989) . While the change in group strategy will 
be captured by the methodology employed to identify 
subperiods of strategic homogeneity, other types of changes 
will be tracked by constructing a summary index. This part 
of the research question does not lend itself to formal 
hypothesis testing, and therefore, a comparative-descriptive 
approach is employed. 
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In addition, the impact of environmental changes on 
inter-group mobility and risk return relationships will also 
be studied. The intent here is to understand how 
discontinuous environmental change increase inter-group 
mobility (Mascarenhas 1989) and consequently, whether this 
produces negative risk return functions as suggested by Cool 
and Schendel (1988) . 
HI: During periods of environmental discontinuity, there 
will be significantly greater inter-group mobility. 
Both adaptation theory and industrial organization 
economics suggest that environmental shifts drive strategy 
changes. According to the adaption perspective, 
organizations try to adapt to environmental changes (Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977) and 10 economics holds that industry structure 
drives firms' conduct and performance (Bain, 1968). Rapid 
environmental changes, however, may result in misalignment 
between an organization and its environment, reducing the 
effectiveness of its current strategy and prompting changes 
intended to improve alignment (Miller & Friesen, 1986) . 
Rumelt (1981) argues that unexpected events such as changes 
in technology, regulation, relative prices, and consumer 
tastes provide potential sources of rents and opportunities 
for strategic repositioning. Consistent with this, 
Mascarenhas (1989) in a study of the oil drilling industry 
found that periods of economic decline were associated with 
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higher intra-industry mobility than periods of economic 
stability and growth. 
H2: Environmental discontinuities will be associated with 
the observance of negative risk return relationships at the 
firm level. 
Conventional finance theory argues that there is a 
positive relationship between risk and return (Brearly & 
Myers 1971) . However, high environmental uncertainty may 
force some firms to undertake strategies that do not turn 
out well, while the same events may provide other firms with 
opportunities that can be exploited at low risk relative to 
the potential return. This is so because firms have a 
differential ability to execute a chosen strategy due to 
differences in their resource endowments. In periods of 
rapid environmental change, these capability differences 
enable some firms to seize opportunities at low risk 
relative to return, while at the same time, causing other 
firms to take high risk actions relative to return (Cool & 
Schendel, 1988) . Risk, therefore, is conceived in terms of 
lack of fit between current strategic behavior and 
accumulated resource base (Cool & Schendel, 1988). This gap 
may then induce the presence of negative risk/return 
relationships at the firm level. Bowman (1980, 1982) and 
Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1986, 1988) also found the presence 
of negative risk/return outcomes at the industry level. 
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3.2 Performance Implications of Strategic Groups 
Q2.) What is the nature of the relationship between 
strategic group membership and firm performance? 
A central concern of strategic management is the 
pursuit of sustainable competitive advantage. Therefore, the 
investigation of the relationship between strategic group 
membership and performance forms a natural focus of this 
study. According to Lewis and Thomas (1990: 386), "Two 
theoretical possibilities may therefore be advanced in 
researching intra-industry performance differences. First, 
that there may be performance differences across groups but 
second, that the uniqueness of firm strategies directed to 
achieve distinctive sets of assets (capital, financial, 
human) may better predict within-industry performance 
differences". 
Research question two then, seeks to examine whether 
some groups outperform other groups within the industry as 
predicted by strategic group theory (Caves & Porter, 1977) . 
And, whether all members of the same strategic group realize 
similar levels of performance? 
H3a: Performance differences measured in economic terms will 
exist between strategic groups during stable strategic time 
periods. 
H3b: Within each period of stable strategic group structure, 
strategic groups will exhibit different levels of risk. 
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H3c: Within each period of stable strategic group structure, 
strategic groups will exhibit dissimilar levels of risk- 
adjusted performance. 
Strategic group theory predicts that the presence of 
mobility barriers prevents the less successful players in an 
industry from imitating the strategies of their more 
successful rivals. This provides an explanation for 
persistent intraindustry performance differences (Caves & 
Porter 1977). Since the height of mobility barriers 
surrounding different strategic groups varies, stable 
performance differences are expected across groups. However, 
as pointed out in the literature review section, previous 
research on this issue is inconclusive. Cool and Schendel 
(1987) found performance differences in terms of market 
share, but not in terms of profitability. In addition, risk 
and risk adjusted performance differences were not observed. 
Fiegenbaum & Thomas (1990) found performance differences 
only across economic and risk dimensions. Lewis and Thomas 
(1990) found support only for the return on sales measure of 
performance out of three measures employed to test 
differences across groups. Nevertheless, it is extremely 
important to establish the linkage of strategic groups to 
performance in order to determine the predictive validity 
and usefulness of the theory (Thomas & Venkatraman 1988, 
Fiegenbaum & Thomas 19 90) . 
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H4: Firms belonging to the same strategic group will not 
realize similar performance levels. 
Cool and Schendel (1988) argued that a large within 
groups variation might have dwarfed the across group 
variation in performance. They found intra group performance 
differences among firms in their study of the pharmaceutical 
industry and suggested that these differences arose due to 
differential resource profiles of the group incumbents, 
which in turn led to differential ability to execute chosen 
strategies as suggested by Porter (1979) . Lawless, Wilsted 
and Burgh (1990) found similar firm level effects in their 
multi-industry study. The burden suggested by these studies 
is that research examining the relationship between 
strategic groups and performance focus on within group 
differences, as well as between groups difference. 
3.3 An Expanded Model of Strategy-Performance Linkage 
Q3.) Does the gap between capabilities and strategy account 
for the variation in measures of firm performance? 
According to the original strategic group theory as 
advanced by Porter (1979), strategic groups combine 
differences among an industry's member firms into a 
systematic theory of profit determination. Cool and Schendel 
(1988) in their study of the pharmaceutical industry, found 
significant performance and risk differences among firms 
within strategic groups. They attributed this to differences 
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in firm asset stocks/capabilities. Even Porter (1979) 
suggested that differential ability to execute a chosen 
strategy may moderate the relationship between strategic 
group membership and firm performance. This research 
question seeks to test empirically whether variation in 
intra industry performance differences can be explained by 
incorporating both strategic group membership and firm 
capabilities into the predictive model. 
H5: A model of intra industry performance difference that 
includes measures of firm capabilities together with 
strategic group membership as predictors will have more 
predictive validity (higher proportion of explained 
variance) than a model omitting capability measures. 
This hypothesis essentially seeks to test whether more 
variation in firm performance can be accounted for once firm 
capabilities are introduced in the model along with 
strategic group membership. If capability measures 
significantly increase the model's ability to account for 
performance variation, this would provide support for the 
arguments in Cool and Schendel (1988) and Porter (1979) . 
3.4 Resource Based Strategic Groups 
Q4.) Are firm resource bundles better predictors of 
strategic group membership than observed product market 
strategies? 
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As pointed out in the introduction, the term "strategic 
groups" was coined by Hunt (1972) to describe competition in 
the white goods industry . However, the pattern, nature, and 
intensity of competition has changed tremendously since then 
(Best, 1990) . While in the past competitive advantage has 
been derived from the creation of privileged product market 
positions, nowadays competitive advantage may accrue by 
investing in specialized skills and competencies that 
transcend products and markets (Hamel & Prahalad, 1989; 
Quinn et al 1990). These competencies in turn, may be the 
drivers of successful product market strategies. Effective 
competition therefore may occur at the level of creation of 
these competencies and rather than at the level of product 
market strategies (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990). 
This research question, then, seeks to examine whether 
it is possible to capture competition at the competency 
level by mapping strategic groups? Further, if the analysis 
produces meaningful groups, then do these groups have better 
predictive validity in terms of differential performance 
effects than groups based on product market strategies. 
H6: Firm resource bundles can be employed to identify 
meaningful strategic groups, as measured by the assessments 
of industry observers. 
If competition in an industry really occurs at the 
level of resource accumulation and if these resources really 
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drive product market strategies, then it should be possible 
to map groups of players in an industry who compete by 
deploying similar resource bundles. Both McGee and Thomas 
(1986, 1989) and Cool and Schendel (1988) have called for 
identifying strategic groups based on firm level distinctive 
competencies and accumulated assets, since these constitute 
the real source of competitive advantage. This exploratory 
hypothesis seeks to test whether empirical support can be 
found for this assertion. Further, following Barney and 
Hoskisson (1990:11) who argue that "without some independent 
test of a group structure's intuitive appeal, the use of 
intimate knowledge as a justification for choosing a 
particular group structure has limited scientific validity", 
the meaningfulness of derived groupings is corroborated by 
industry experts. 
H7: Increased differential performance effects will be 
associated with resource based strategic groups, as compared 
to product market based groups. 
If these resource based groups are really more stable 
and well defined than the product market based groups as 
argued above, then we would expect to find strong support 
for differential across group performance effects. 
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CHAPTER IV 
METHODOLOGY 
The setting for this study is the U.S. Banking 
industry. The banking industry has undergone tremendous 
changes in recent years brought upon by the forces of 
deregulation, technological developments, and globalization. 
These changes have provided much greater opportunities for 
competitive differentiation and have led to a significant 
increase in the degree of competition in this previously 
regulated and largely uniform industry. 
The progressive deregulation of the banking industry in 
the last decade provides a fascinating insight into the 
dynamics of strategic readjustment as firms' with 
asymmetrical resource bases adopt different product market 
strategies to distance themselves from one another. This 
opportunity to observe the dynamic process of competitive 
reconfiguration by firms with differential resource profiles 
is the driving force behind the selection of this industry. 
Two other considerations which influence the choice of 
the banking industry for the study are: (1) Detailed data 
bases are available for this industry. This facilitates a 
richer and more accurate description of industry specific 
strategies and strategic groups. (2) And, this researcher's 
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own keen interest and working knowledge of this industry. An 
understanding of the industry is prerequisite for performing 
its strategic group analysis (Cool & Schendel, 1987) . 
4.1 Research Design: Longitudinal Facet 
A two stage research design is to be employed to test 
the above research questions and hypotheses. A longitudinal 
design will be used in the first stage to address research 
questions 1 and 2 and the accompanying hypotheses. Then in 
the second stage, a cross sectional design will be used to 
address research questions 3 and 4 along with their 
associated hypotheses. To enhance expositional clarity, the 
methodology for each of these stages is described 
separately. 
4.1.1 Sample 
The sample for this study is the top sixty firms in the 
U.S. Banking industry. Although there are some 12,000 banks 
in the United States, the top sixty banks capture 
approximately 65% of the aggregate banking assets. This 
sample limitation is imposed to facilitate detailed 
examination of intra-group performance patterns, firm 
mobility, and most importantly, identification of firm level 
competencies. A larger sample would make it almost 
impossible to execute the cross sectional facet of the 
dissertation. (This is discussed below.) Further, all single 
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industry, longitudinal studies of strategic groups have 
found it essential to impose limitations on their sample 
size, to enhance the depth and richness of analysis (Cool 
1985; Fiegenbaum 1987). 
The top sixty banks based on asset size were identified 
in 1988, and then any bank which in ranked in the top sixty 
in any of the previous fifteen years (to 1974) was added to 
the list. This yielded a sample of 73 banks. However, for 
five of these banks - Boatmen's Bancshares, European 
American Bancorp., First American Corp.-Tenn., First of 
America Bank, and Meridian Bancorp, data was not available 
for the entire fifteen year period, and consequently, these 
were dropped from the sample. This yielded a final sample of 
68 bank holding companies, which is easily the largest 
sample for any single industry strategic group study in the 
literature to date. 
4.1.2 Data Sources 
The primary data base for this study is Standard and 
Poor's Bank Compustat tapes. Phis data base provides 
financial, statistical and market information on 
approximately 146 of the largest, publicly traded banks. (As 
discussed above only 68 of these will be analyzed.) Data 
reliability and validity procedures are fairly rigorous. 
This data base was supplemented by Value Line Investor's 
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Survey, 10-k annual statements, federal reserve bulletins, 
and the trade press. 
4.1.3 Mapping the Strategic Space 
Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1990) have suggested that any 
strategic group study should begin with a mapping of 
strategic space. Strategic space consists of the levels of 
organizational strategy, the components of strategic 
decisions and the chosen time period. An important initial 
step consists of the definition of the temporal horizon. The 
time period chosen for this study is the period from 1974 to 
1988. This fifteen year period covers six years before and 
eight years after the passage of landmark Depository 
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (DIDMA) 
of 1980 which significantly deregulated the industry. This, 
then would enable us to study the patterns of competition, 
both before and after deregulation in the industry. 
The next step consists of resolving the issue of level 
of organizational strategy to be investigated. Following 
Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1990), it was decided to from groups 
at corporate strategy level since diversification in this 
industry occurs within the industry and not across industry 
boundaries. Also because of substantial tax advantages banks 
are structured in the bank holding company (BHC) form of 
organization. About 1800 of these BHCs or about 80% of the 
total consist of single banks, and the rest have a portfolio 
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of 10-15 banks on average. Effective competition in the 
banking industry occurs at the level of these BHCs (Graddy & 
Spencer, 1990) . 
The final step in mapping strategic space consists of 
identification of firms' strategies. Cool and Schendel 
(1987), and Hofer and Schendel (1978) have argued that scope 
and resource deployment components of strategy reflect major 
strategic decisions for a firm and that competitive 
advantage and synergy accrue as a result of these decisions. 
Therefore, it was decided to study the scope and resource 
deployment components of strategic decisions in the Banking 
industry. 
Eleven variables reflecting these components were 
identified after a through literature search and discussions 
with industry analysts and executives. While an argument can 
be made that these variables are idiosyncratic and industry 
specific, this problem is unavoidable in strategic group 
research. The very nature of this line of inquiry is 
industry specific and requires a priori understanding of the 
industry by the researcher (Cool, 1985/ Cool & Schendel, 
1988). With that caveat in mind, this researcher believes 
that these variables adequately capture the key bases of 
competition in the banking industry. These were subsequently 
corroborated by the industry analysts who were interviewed 
for the cross-sectional phase of this study. Table 4.1 
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summarizes the definitions of these variables. Each of these 
is elaborated below: 
4.1.4 Strategic Variables 
A) Strategic scope variables. 
Scope commitments in the U.S. banking industry can be 
measured by product scope, geographic scope and product 
diversity. 
1) Product scope (Cl, RE, TIM & DEM)This is captured 
by four variables - the ratio of commercial and industrial 
loans/total loans (Cl), the ratio of real estate loans/total 
loans (RE) , the ratio of time deposits /total deposits 
(TIM), and the ratio of demand deposits /total deposits 
(DEM). Cl is negatively correlated with consumer lending and 
represents the degree of involvement of the BHC in the 
wholesale market as opposed to retail market. RE1 on the 
other hand captures the dependence of the organization on 
the specialized real estate market segment. TIM and DEM 
capture the breakdown of the fixedness/time horizon and the 
composition of the banks' liability/funding base. 
2) Geographical reach (FND)Since the domestic 
geographical scope of BHCs is restricted by the legal 
1 To be more precise, the real estate portfolio should be 
broken down into commercial real estate and domestic real estate 
lending. Unfortunately, the compustat database does not provide 
such a breakdown, and therefore aggregate numbers were used. 
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limitations on interstate/interregional banking in the 
U.S.,2 the international reach of these BHCs is 
investigated by looking at the ratio of foreign owned 
deposits to the total deposit base. This variable is 
positively correlated with loans to foreign governments and 
interest rate swaps. 
3) Product diversity (NIR)The percentage of 
noninterest revenues/Total revenues is employed as a broad 
reflection of product diversity in the banks' strategy. This 
variable is a proxy for investment banking/fee based 
activities and in effect shows the extent of non traditional 
banking operations employed to generate revenues. 
B) Resource deployment variables 
Operations and finance are two key functional areas 
from which competitive advantage may particularly accrue to 
a banking organization. Indeed, control of expenses and loan 
loss reserves reflect operational efficiency, whereas the 
degree of leverage, funding strategies and investment 
decisions indicates differences in strategic financial 
skills. Five measures of resource commitments were developed 
in order to reflect these bases for establishing competitive 
advantage in the banking industry. 
1) Funding (NPF) This is the ratio of net purchased 
funds to total assets. This ratio is negatively correlated 
2 Although restrictions on interstate banking are scheduled to 
gradually fade away beginning in 1991, they were largely in place 
at the time of this study. 
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with core deposits and liquidity and shows the degree to 
which the bank relies on purchasing funds in the open market 
rather than depending on its deposit base to fund its 
assets. In effect the higher this ratio is, the more 
aggressive the bank in its outlook and the more willing it 
is to make use of opportunities in the market place as they 
arise. 
2) Capitalization (LEV)This ratio captures the 
degree of financial leverage or the riskiness of the banks' 
strategy. It is operationalized as the ratio of equity 
capital to total assets. 
3) Investments (GRA) For a bank, the investment 
decisions basically consist of finding ways to increase its 
asset base. The U.S. banking industry has seen a spate of 
intra-state and intra-regional mergers and acquisitions of 
smaller banks by the larger BHCs since the process of 
deregulation was set in motion in the early 80s. This 
activity is captured by looking at the year to year growth 
in assets. 
4) Expense ratio (CS) This is a measure of 
efficiency and shows the degree to which the banking 
organizations focus on keeping costs down in their 
production process in order to establish a competitive 
advantage. It is operationalized as the ratio of non¬ 
interest expenses/total assets. 
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5) Provisions (PROV) This is the percentage of loan 
lease loss reserve/average loans and leases and reflects the 
efficiency and effectiveness of a bank's production process 
in recognizing problem loans and making adequate provisions 
against those losses. 
4.1.5 Performance Variables 
The performance of firms is a complex and a 
multidimensional phenomenon. Recently, accounting based 
measures of performance have been subject to criticism 
(Fisher & McGovern, 1983; McGuire & Schneeweis, 1983) . Some 
of the problems cited include: accounting manipulation, 
undervaluation of assets, distortions due to depreciation 
policies, inventory valuation, treatment of certain revenue 
and expenditure items, and differences in the methods of 
consolidating accounts. A distinction is also generally 
drawn between economic performance (which presents a static 
picture grounded in historical trends) and strategic 
performance (which looks at the future value/earning power 
of the firm). Freeman (1984), for example, has noted that 
the usual focus on economic goals is too myopic in the 
context of strategic management. He suggests that strategic 
management actions should be evaluated according to their 
impact on the broad set of stakeholders, rather just 
shareholders. 
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Cool (1985) has suggested that at least three different 
dimensions of firm performance should be examined: levels of 
economic performance, risk characteristics, and risk- 
adjusted performance levels. Each of these dimensions of 
firm performance, in turn, suggest several performance 
measures. However, in this study it is proposed to employ 
strategic measures of performance instead of economic 
measures to capture the performance construct more 
meaningfully. Chakravarthy (1986: 437) argues that " useful 
measures of strategic performance are those that help assess 
the quality of a firm's adaptation." He further suggests 
that firm adaptation is critically dependent on the 
generation of slack resources. He notes that "profitability, 
productivity and the ability to raise long-term resources 
form the core measures in the study of slack resources 
available to a firm" (Chakarvarthy 1986: 450). Three 
different performance variables, therefore, are employed 
along each of these dimensions. These are: 
1) ROAA :- This is the standard return on average asset 
measure frequently employed to evaluate bank performance. 
This measures the profitability aspect of strategic 
performance. 
2) Employee productivity (PPE) :- For a service 
organization like a bank, human resources are its biggest 
resource, and therefore productivity per employee is an 
important performance criteria. This is operationalized by 
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dividing the net profit by the number of employees. This 
then measures the productivity aspect of strategic 
performance. 
3) P/E Ratio: Price earnings multiple is a market based 
measure of performance and reflects the price 
multiple/premium which the financial markets are willing to 
pay over firms' current earnings. In essence, this is a 
measure of discounted flows of the firms' estimated future 
earnings and reflects its future earning power. This then 
reflects the third dimension of strategic performance, 
namely the ability to raise long term resources. 
4.1.6 Risk Measures 
Risk will be measured by estimating the variance of 
returns within each strategic period for each measure of 
performance. Many researchers have used the variance of a 
firm's return over time as a proxy for risk (Armour & Teece, 
1978; Bettis, 1981; Bettis & Hall, 1982; Bowman, 1980; 
Christensen & Montgomery, 1981; Fisher & Hall, 1969; Rumelt, 
1974). Finally, risk-adjusted measures will be calculated by 
simply dividing the strategic performance by their risk 
estimates. In sum, this procedure will give us nine measures 
of performance. Table 4.2 presents an overview of these 
measures. 
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4.1.7 Identification of Stable Strategic Time Periods 
(SSTPs) 
The structure of strategic groups may change over time 
as firms alter their strategic mix in order to match their 
skills and resources to the opportunities and threats in the 
external environment. Consequently, it is important to 
identify subperiods of homogeneity for which strategic group 
structure is more stable within each period than between 
periods. Fiegenbaum & Thomas (1990) have suggested that 
SSTPs should be identified by using the following criteria: 
(1) The variance-covariance matrix of the strategic 
variables should remain unchanged. 
(2) The average (mean) behavior of the firms in terms 
of the strategic variables should remain 
relatively unchanged. 
The rationale for using first criteria is that when 
firms change commitments along the strategic variables, the 
covariances between these variables should reflect this 
strategic repositioning. By determining the point in time 
when the covariance structure for all firms considered 
simultaneously, changes from previous periods, it is 
possible to establish breakpoints where significant 
dissimilarities occur. These breakpoints indicate the 
existence of distinct subperiods with different strategic 
group structures (Cool 1985). 
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The rationale for the second criteria is that it is 
possible for values of the strategic variables to change 
without changing the value of the variance-covariance 
matrix. In this case, although the relative relationship 
between strategic variables will remain the same, the entire 
industry will have shifted to a new set of mean values in 
terms of key strategic decision variables. Therefore, 
Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1990) recommend that SSTPs should be 
identified by looking at changes in both mean vectors and 
variance-covariance matrices. 
The procedure to evaluate SSTPs over t time periods 
starts by testing the hypothesis of equality of the 
covariance matrices for first two periods. 
H0 :£i =£ 2 
against E1 : both are not equal 
where represents the variance/covariance matrix between 
strategic variables for a specific period. 
If the null hypothesis of no change between the two periods 
is accepted for a chosen significance level, then the two 
periods are pooled and the third period is introduced as 
Hr 
Hr 
: t12 “ ^ 3 
= £_ 23 
against Hx : not all > are equal (for both H0) 
where >12 andf>23 denote the variance-covariance 
matrices of data pooled over the first two periods and the 
last two periods. 
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Two null hypothesis are tested because even if the 
variance-covariance matrix for first two periods is not 
significantly different form the last period, significant 
change might occur over the last two periods. If both null 
hypothesis are accepted, then the three periods are pooled 
together and procedure continues. In general, the following 
test procedure is performed in year i: 
■ 
1 
against Hx : Not all >are equal 
A similar procedure is performed for the mean vectors. 
To verify the statistical significance of the changes, 
Bartlett test (Green 1978) will be used to test the 
equivalence of two sets of variance/covariance matrices, 
while Hotelling's T2 test (Green 1978) will be used to 
compare two sets of means. 
4.1.8 Analysis 
Strategic groups will be identified by using a cluster 
analysis. A good clustering algorithm groups cases into 
clusters, maximizing the across cluster variation, while 
simultaneously minimizing the within cluster variation, so 
as to yield a tight clustering solution. Previous research 
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has used hierarchical agglomerative clustering techniques to 
identify strategic groups. However, these techniques are 
biased in favor of generating equal sized clusters, and they 
suffer from the centriod drift problem (Punj & Stewart, 
1983). Therefore, this study will employ a more 
sophisticated two stage clustering algorithm, where 
hierarchical clustering technique (Ward's minimum variance 
criterion) will be used in the first stage to arrive at the 
seed values and approximate number of clusters for 
subsequent iterative partitioning in the second stage. 
The following stopping rule recommended by Harrigan 
(1985) and Fiegenbaum & Thomas (1990) will be used to 
determine the optimum number of clusters in each SSTP: 
1) An additional cluster increases the overall fit 
(measured in terms of R2 coefficient) by less than 5% 
percent (R2 \< 5%). 
2) The clusters obtained explains at least X% (X to be 
determined empirically by the nature of the data) of 
the overall variance (R2 >/ X%) . 
A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) will then 
be performed across strategic groups to establish whether 
identified clusters really have different profiles of 
strategic scope and resource deployment commitments. Then a 
one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) will be performed on 
every strategic variable, for each period, to determine on 
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what competitive dimensions the identified strategic groups 
really differ. 
Again MANOVA and ANOVA tests, using performance 
measures as dependent variables and strategic group 
membership as independent variables, will be performed 
across and within groups in each SSTP to test the 
associations between strategic groups and performance (H3) 
and to examine within groups performance variance (H4). The 
impact of discontinuous environmental changes on inter-group 
mobility (HI) will be examined by constructing a mobility 
index. Finally, the presence of negative risk return 
relationships (H2) will be tested by performing a regression 
of return on risk. 
Summarizing, this facet of analysis will begin by 
mapping out the strategic space and then identifying sub¬ 
periods of strategic homogeneity (SSTPs) within the study 
period. Strategic groups will be identified within each of 
these SSTPs by performing a two-stage cluster analysis. 
Statistical techniques of regression analysis, MANOVA, and 
ANOVA will then be used to test hypothesis H2 through H4. 
4.2 Research Design: Cross-Sectional Facet 
In the second stage of this dissertation a cross- 
sectional research design is employed to address research 
question numbers three and four and test hypotheses five, 
sis, and seven. This part of the project is field based and 
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involves formulation of an expert panel. This expert panel 
will be composed of bank analysts at major investment 
houses. Analysts have been recognized to be the best and 
most authoritative sources for industry information (Brown & 
Rozoff 1983). 
4.2.1 Composition of the Expert panel 
Three criteria were established to pick bank analysts 
for the panel of industry experts: 
Each individual should have at least ten years 
experience in the industry. 
- He/She should be frequently quoted and interviewed 
in the Wall Street Journal and the business and 
trade press. 
They should be working for a major Wall Street 
investment bank. 
Following these criteria, a ten person panel was 
constituted. Table 4.3 lists the names and affiliations of 
panel members at the time of data collection. This panel 
cumulatively embodies over 200 years of industry experience 
and represents the "creme-de-la-creme" of the industry. 
4.2.2 Data Collection 
This process began in the summer of 1991 with an 
initial round of interviews with Hanley, Bryan, Aspinwall 
and Dempsey. It is worthwhile to note that Hanley and Bryan 
75 
are widely regarded as one of the best analysts' and 
consultants' respectively, in the industry. While both 
Aspinwall and Bryan have written internationally recognized 
books on banking strategy. 
At these preliminary interviews discussions focused on 
understanding the key drivers of competition in the banking 
industry. Professor Ingo Walter (1986), who is an 
acknowledged authority on the banking industry, has 
identified a set of eight key capabilities/skills which 
provide competitive advantage in the financial services 
industry. This list was utilized to provide a framework for 
these discussions. Based on the input from these experts the 
initial list of eight was expanded and recast into ten key 
resources which provide a sustainable competitive advantage 
in the banking industry. These are detailed below at end of 
this subsection. 
Another issue which came up for discussion at these 
initial interviews was nature and design of the instrument 
for measuring these resources. The researcher wanted to 
employ questionnaires with industry grounded anchors, but it 
was suggested that this was not feasible (for instance, it 
is very difficult to operationalize placing power from high 
to low), and unnecessary, since these people were experts. 
Consequently, single rating sheets were developed which 
measured each of the ten resources on a seven point Likert 
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scale ranging from low to high. Appendix I shows a sample 
rating sheet. 
In the next stage, each of the panel members was 
personally contacted for semi-structured interviews. These 
discussions began by a general discussion of competitive 
dynamics in the industry. This served as an ice-breaker and 
a credibility builder. Then an overview of the entire study 
was presented to them, and finally, the importance and 
relevance of each of the ten resources was discussed to 
establish a common frame of reference. After the panelists 
understood into the study, they were asked to rate the banks 
that they personally followed on each of the ten resources. 
One rating sheet was used for each bank and these rating 
sheets along with written description of the ten key 
resources was left with the panel members, to be scored at 
their convenience and returned to this researcher. 
To avoid potential perceptual biases, the panelists 
were asked to rate each bank with respect to the industry as 
a whole and not with reference to the group that they 
followed3. While a certain degree of contamination by the 
"halo effect" (superior performers being rated high on every 
thing) is unavoidable, all references to performance were 
scrupulously avoided during the interviews and in the 
description of capabilities. This strategy did seem to work, 
3 I am indebted to Professor Charles Fombrun for pointing this 
out to me. 
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as some poor performing banks (Marine Midland, Republic NY) 
were rated highly, indicating their long term value, while 
current high performers (e.g.Boatmen's bancshares) were 
rated poorly, indicating its poor strategic health. 
4.2.3 Sample 
It is important to note that most analysts follow 15-20 
banks on an average and most investment banks generally 
track the top 25-30 banks. This places a limitation on the 
sample for which data could be collected from the expert 
panel. But it does increase the reliability and validity of 
the measures. It was decided to get a minimum of three 
ratings for each bank. Also, for some larger firms like 
Goldman Sachs and Kidder Peabody, two or three different 
analysts rated the banks that they personally followed, 
thereby increasing the reliability of the data. Following 
this procedure a final sample of 44 banks was assembled, 
each rated by at least 3 analysts. On about 30 banks, more 
than five different ratings were obtained. All of these 
banks fell within the top sixty ranked by asset size as of 
March 31, 1991. 
Next, I elaborate on definitions of the ten resources 
for which data was collected. These are ranked in descending 
order of importance, as suggested by Mr. Hanley of Soloman 
Brothers. The discussion here closely follows Walter (1986). 
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4.2.4 Description of Key Resources 
1) Management Quality and Depth: The quality and depth of a 
banks' management team is the most critical resource in 
establishing a sustainable competitive advantage. In some 
sense, it is the most generic of all skills from which the 
others flow. The quality of leadership, clear strategic 
vision, management development, ability to attract and 
retain high quality people, compensation and reward systems, 
and prevalence of a credit culture determine the quality and 
depth of management. 
2) Franchise: According to Walter (1986:38) "an 
institution's franchise is its most intangible asset, yet 
one that clearly distinguishes ex post the most successful 
competitors - from the rest". Strategic management 
research is also paying increasing attention to corporate 
reputations as a source of competitive advantage. A banks' 
franchise is generally linked to a specific type of 
competence and expertise, developed over time and valued by 
the market. 
3) Asset/Credit Quality: Banks fund their assets (primarily 
loans) by their deposit base and by purchasing funds in the 
open market. In the deregulated banking environment, firms 
are increasingly forced to bid for funds. The perceived 
quality of the firms' asset base reflects the riskiness of 
its loan portfolio and is an determinant of its funding 
cost. This is particularly evident in the interbank market 
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where institutions with lesser perceived quality or riskier 
asset structures are forced to pay a premium over other 
firms in order to fund themselves. This premium also signals 
an impaired credit rating to the banks' clients, further 
damaging its competitive position. The perceived quality of 
institutional risk base thus conveys substantial advantages 
on the funding side and sends strong signals to corporate 
clients. 
4) Technological Expertise: Technological systems and 
capabilities provide tremendous advantage in the banking 
industry. Since banking is a highly knowledge intensive 
industry, the ability of the bank's technological systems to 
sift through large amounts of data and provide quality 
information on a real time basis is a valuable asset in the 
banking industry. Technology is both process and product 
related. Provision of decision support systems and "back 
office" processing systems represent the process aspect of 
technology in the banking industry. While financial 
engineering products such as corporate financial services, 
swaps etc. which generate fee based income for the bank, 
represent product related financial technologies. 
5) Placing Power: This represents the distribution 
capabilities and "muscle" of a bank. With the continued 
securitization in the financial markets, placing power is 
becoming an increasingly important competitive variable in 
the banking industry. Placing power is very important for 
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the investment banking arm of the banks in helping it to 
sell loans and arrange syndication. 
6) Adequacy of the Capital Base: A strong capital base 
confers a significant competitive power in the banking 
industry. It is the principal determinant of an 
institution's risk bearing ability and enables successful 
players to fully exploit market opportunities by engaging in 
mergers and acquisitions. Further, it facilitates 
introduction of specific products to the international 
markets and the provision of value added services to the 
clients. And finally, while it helps in achieving regulatory 
compliance, it also reduces the cost of funding. 
7) Resource Management/Efficiencv: This represents the 
ability of a bank to judiciously manage its physical and 
human resources so as to lower its fixed cost base, while 
obtaining high quality service from its human resources. 
Modern relationship based banking is essentially a "people 
business" and human resources are the single most critical 
competitive resource for service organizations, consequently 
their effective management is very important. 
8) Innovation: In the banking industry innovation can be 
looked upon as the introduction of new process or technique 
that provides durable returns and adds significant value to 
the client. Due to the absence of any patent or copyright 
protection, the imitation-lag for financial innovations 
tends to be relatively short. Consequently, "it is important 
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for an institution to maintain a continuous stream of 
innovations - in this sense, an institution's most important 
innovation is its next one" (Walter 1986 :37) . While 
innovative capabilities are a function of the quality of 
human capital and technological expertise, they are also 
sensitive to organizational culture, management, reward 
systems, horizontal communication and cross-functional 
information exchange. 
9) Risk Management: This represents the ability of a bank to 
prudently manage and evaluate its portfolio risk composed of 
credit risk, interest rate risk, default risk, exchange rate 
risk, along with its operating risk on an ongoing basis. 
10) Information Asymmetries: Banking in particular and 
financial services in general is a highly information¬ 
intensive business. All forms of lending, development of 
client specific services and other credit related activities 
are critically dependent on the collection, processing and 
evaluation of large amounts of information. Information is 
unique, in that it is the only resource which can be used 
simultaneously in the production of a large number of 
services. In fact in 1984, Walter Wriston, former C.E.O. of 
Citicorp redefined Citicorp's business from banking to that 
of processing and selling information. Walter (1986:32) 
notes, "Indeed asymmetries of information among various 
competitors and their clients contribute a great deal toward 
explaining differentials in competitive performance". 
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The fact that there was lot of variance on the ratings 
(in other words, every bank was not uniformly excellent on 
all the ten attributes), and that a high degree of consensus 
was observed among the raters inspires confidence in the 
reliability of the procedure. 
4.2.5 Analysis 
Scores of each bank on these capability measures will 
be averaged and then used to cluster them into strategic 
groups. Same clustering procedure and stopping rules will be 
used as outlined in the analysis section of the longitudinal 
design. The resulting clusters will then be examined for 
validity. If these clusters are meaningful (as judged by the 
experts), then hypothesis six would be upheld. Hypothesis 
seven would be tested by performing ANOVA tests on 
performance measures for these clusters/groups, to determine 
if clear cut performance differences exist across these 
resource based strategic groups. The third research question 
and its accompanying hypotheses five, will be tested by 
using a variance decomposition model to partition intragroup 
performance differences into effects due to strategic group 
membership and effects due to firm capabilities. 
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Table 4.1 Corporate strategy variables and their definition 
in the Banking industry 
Strategic Strategic Strategic 
Component Function Variable Definition 
A. Scope A1: Product scope 
A2: Geographic 
reach 
A3: Product 
diversity 
B. Resource B1: Production 
Deployment 
B2: Finance 
B3: Investment 
1. Cl Commencial & Ind. loans 
2. RE 
Gross Loans 
Real estate loans 
3. TIM 
Gross Loans 
Total time deposits 
4. DEM 
Total deposits 
Total demand deposits 
5. FND 
Total deposits 
Foreign owned deposits 
6. NIR 
Total deposits 
Noninterest revenues 
7. C.S. 
Total revenues 
Noninterest expense 
8. PROV 
Total assets 
Loan-lease loss reserve 
9. NPF 
Average loans & losses 
Net purchased funds 
10. LEV 
Total assets 
Common Equity 
Total assets 
11. GRA Year-to-year growth 
in assets 
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Table 4.2 Performance variables 
Performance Performance 
dimension measure Notation Definition 
1. Economic Return on ROAA Net Income 
assets 
Average Assets 
Price PE Closing Market Price 
earnings ratio 
Earnings Per Share 
Productivity 
per employee 
PPE Net Income 
Number of Employees 
2. Risk Risk of return SROAA Standard deviation 
on assets of ROAA 
Risk of PE SPE Standard deviation 
mutliples of PE 
Risk of SPPE Standard deviation 
productivity of PPE 
3. Risk Risk-adjusted VROAA The ratio of 
Adjusted for ROAA ROAA/SROAA 
Risk-adjusted 
for PE 
VPE The ratio of PE/SPE 
Risk-adjusted VPPE The ratio of 
for PPE PPE/SPPE 
Note: Net Income is income before adjustments for 
extraordinary gains and losses. 
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Table 4.3 Expert Panel 
- Thomas Hanley Managing Director, Soloman Brothers 
- Jim McDermott President & Director of Research, 
Keefe Bruyette & Woods 
- Judah Kraushaar First Vice President, Merrill Lynch 
- Charles Peabody Sr. V.P. Research, Kidder Peabody 
- Ted Paluszek V.P. Research, Kidder Peabody 
- Sally P. Davis V.P. Investment Research, Goldman Sachs 
- Tom McCandless V.P. Investment Research, Goldman Sachs 
- Dick Goleniewski V.P. Investment Research, Goldman Sachs 
- Michael Plodwick V.P. Research, C.J. Lawrence Inc. 
- James Hansbury V.P. Research, Wertheim Schroder & Co. 
- Frank Suoozo V.P. Research, S.G. Warburg 
- Ray Soifer Manager, Brown Brothers Harriman 
In addition, the following people contributed actively towards 
developing and refining the capabilities measure: 
- Lowell Bryan Managing Director & Chief banking Consultant, 
Mckinsey & Co. 
- Dick Aspinwall Chief Economist, Chase Manhattan 
- Joe Dempsey V.P. Manufactures Hanover 
- Steve Rhoades Chief, Financial Structure Div. 
Federal Reserve, Washington 
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Chapter V 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
This chapter reports on the results of the analyses of 
the four research questions and their seven associated 
hypotheses in the U.S. Banking industry from 1974-1988. It 
begins by detailing the identification of sub-periods within 
the fifteen year study horizon and the mapping of strategic 
groups in each of these sub-periods. Then the results of 
individual hypotheses are presented. 
5.1 Identification of SSTP's 
The identification of stable strategic time periods 
(SSTP's) is the starting point of empirical analysis and is 
of critical importance. Since strategic groups will be 
mapped in each of these sub-periods separately, this 
procedure must be executed carefully. 
As discussed in chapter four, the rationale for 
identifying subperiods is to uncover distinct periods in 
which the industry is more stable within a particular period 
than it is between periods. Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1990) 
have suggested two statistical tests to identify these 
points of transition: 
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1) To look at breaks in variance covariance matrices of 
strategic variables, using the Bartlett's F test. 
2) To examine the shifts in mean vectors using the 
Hotelling's T-test. 
To perform these tests, matrices consisting of data on 
the scope and resource deployment variables for each firm 
for each year were created. Then a iterative procedure as 
discussed in chapter three was employed to execute these 
tests. The process begins by comparing the variance 
covariance matrices and mean vectors of 1974 with 1975. If 
no differences are found then these two years are pooled and 
compared with 1976. Next, 1974 is compared with pooled 1975 
and 1976, since even if no changes occurred in first two 
years, it is possible that some change might have occurred 
in the last two years. If both lead to a failure to reject 
the null hypothesis of no differences, then 1974, 1975 and 
1976 are pooled. Iterative tests are conducted in a similar 
fashion up to 1988 according to the algorithm specified in 
chapter three. 
The outcome of this test procedure depends upon the 
choice of the set of variables, the composition of sample 
firms, and the choice of the significance level defined for 
the statistical test (type-I error). To increase the 
robustness of results, a significance level of 1% ( =0.01) 
was consistently applied across tests. Sensitivity analysis 
using jackknifing procedures were conducted by performing 
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the statistical tests on a reduced set of variables and then 
on a reduced set of firms. This led to a total of 293 tests 
being conducted. 
Table 5.1 shows the net result of these analysis. 
Hotelling's T test was significant almost between each year, 
indicating significant increase in the magnitude of the values 
on the scope and resource deployment variables. Since this did 
not correspond with actual industry events, and given the fact 
that mean vectors can shift due to effects of inflation. 
Hotelling's T test was deemed unreliable and exclusive 
reliance was placed on variance-covariance testing, for which 
a Box's M test (Neter & Wasserman, 1985) was employed. Cool 
(1985) and Cool & Schendel (1987, 1988) also relied 
exclusively on variance covariance testing to identify 
temporal breakpoints. 
Statistical tests alone cannot guarantee that true "state 
of nature" has been discovered. However, corroboration of 
these results by significant industry events, can enhance the 
validity of these results. Table 5.1 compares the 
statistically derived SSTPs with industry events. The first 
transition occurred in year 1980 when the landmark DIDMCA was 
passed. The next break in 1983 followed the passage of another 
regulatory initiative the Garn St. Germain Act which further 
deregulated the industry. The 1986 and 1987 transitions 
represent the effect on the industry of the Mexican debt 
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rescheduling and the LDC debt crisis. The 1988 subperiod shows 
a rebounding industry helped along by an overheated economy. 
To ascertain how banks have repositioned themselves vis-a 
-vis each other, cluster analysis was performed to determine 
the strategic groups in each of the six identified subperiods. 
The results of this analysis are presented next. 
5.2 Identification and Description of Strategic Groups Within 
Each Period 
To identify the strategic groups within each SSTP, data 
on strategic variables was averaged for the duration of the 
SSTP, and then cluster analysis was performed on these means. 
Previous research has employed Ward's minimum variance method 
for clustering firms into strategic groups. But this method is 
biased towards generating equal sized clusters and is subject 
to the centroid drift problem (Punj and Stewart 1983) . To 
overcome these problems, a two stage clustering program, where 
Ward's hierarchical agglomerative clustering is used in the 
first stage to generate seed values and the approximate number 
of clusters for iterative partitioning in the second stage, 
was employed. 
Since hypothesis testing for stability and performance 
effects is totally dependent on correct identification of 
strategic groups, great care was exercised to accurately 
identify groups. Multiple methods were employed to arrive at 
the number of strategic groups/clusters. The first method 
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employed was the cluster stopping rule recommended by Harrigan 
(1985) and Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1990), i.e. 
Clusters explain at least 65% of the overall 
variance in the data 
- And, an additional cluster adds less than 5% to the 
variance explained 
While the entire analysis in this study was carried out using 
the SPSS PC software program, this test was performed using 
the FastClus program in SAS, since the SPSS program output 
does not give the R2 explained and the incremental change in 
R2. 
These results were corroborated by looking for breaks in 
the agglomeration schedule of hierarchical clustering routine 
and inspecting the scree plots (Everitt 1980). Then the 
procedure was reversed by running a discriminant analysis to 
verify the classification rates of the identified groups. To 
enhance the robustness of these results jackknifing procedures 
using a reduced set of variables and holdout sampling were 
employed. The results remained the same. 
Finally, a MANOVA was run on identified clusters to see 
whether the clusters really differed on strategic scope and 
resource deployment commitments. Then an ANOVA was performed 
on every strategy variable, for each period, to establish on 
what competitive dimensions the identified strategic groups 
really differed. Tables 5.2 to 5.7, show the results of this 
analysis as well as the group mean and standard deviations on 
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each strategic dimension. These group mean and standard 
deviations were employed to develop a profile of each cluster 
and to dynamically track these clusters over time. Figures 5.1 
to 5.6 show the group membership of each firm within each 
SSTP. This is discussed next, along with an exposition of key 
changes between periods. 
5.3 Strategic Group Dynamics 
In the first SSTP, four strategic groups are observed . 
(See table 5.2 and figure 5.1) A detailed description of each 
of these follows. 
5.3.1 Strategic Groups in the Period 1974-79 
Group 1: This is the domestic retail banking group, which 
primarily meet localized banking needs and are growing at the 
industry average growth rates, with their loan portfolio split 
almost evenly between real estate and commercial markets and 
deposit base tilted in favor of demand deposits. They are 
characterized by the lowest noninterest revenues, poor expense 
management and high capitalization. These banks largely depend 
on their deposit base for funding their asset growth and shy 
away from buying fed funds in the open market. 
Group 2: The largest of all groups, this is the global 
multirisk cluster, which accounts for 63% of sample assets. 
This group has the highest degree of foreign exposure and is 
the largest purchaser of federal funds. It has the highest 
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growth rate, noninterest revenues and fixed/time deposits, 
while having the lowest equity capital, real estate loans and 
noninterest expenses. 
Group 3: is the diversified regionals. This group is similar 
to the global group in its orientation, except that its 
deposit base is split evenly between demand and time deposits, 
and its foreign exposure is significantly less than the 
globals. Its growth rate is the lowest, but it is better 
capitalized than the global group, although its commercial and 
industrial loans and fed funds purchased are nearly at the 
same levels, while its real estate loans are higher than the 
global group. 
Group 4: This is the real estate oriented tier I recrionals. 
This group is below industry average in its fee based 
activities and purchase of federal funds. The focal point of 
its strategy is a concentration in real estate markets. It 
also has significantly less foreign exposure than the 
diversified regionals. The composition of its deposit base is 
not as spread out as the diversified group, although its 
participation in the commercial loan market is almost same as 
the diversified regional group. Its capitalization is better 
than both global and diversified regional group. 
5.3.2 Key Changes in 1980-82 (See Table 5.3 and Figure 5.2) 
Two new groups emerge. Group 2 is the aggressive 
acquirers group, which is characterized by high growth, 
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highest capitalization, heavy involvement in wholesale 
markets, fee based activities, and a high degree of fed funds 
purchase. Group 5 is the trust banking group which is 
characterized by a focus on specialized trust and custodial 
business as indicated by an excessive contribution of 
noninterest revenues to its operations. 
The domestic retail banking group diffuses across 
diversified regionals, the real estate oriented tier I 
regionals, and the newly formed aggressive acquirers group. 
The global group is highly stable with only Chemical Bank 
attempting a strategic repositioning and moving into the newly 
formed trust banking group. The diversified regional acquires 
thirteen new members, while losing nine firms. Four of these 
moved to the trust group and another four shifted to the 
aggressive acquirers group. The R.E oriented tier I regionals 
have one new entry, while losing nine firms: eight to the 
diversified regional and one to the trust banking group. This 
reflects a broadening of strategic focus by these firms. 
Provisions for loan-lease losses became a significant 
clustering dimension in this SSTP as opposed to the previous 
one. 
5.3.3 Key Changes in 1983-85 (See Table 5.4 and Figure 5.3) 
A new high growth retail oriented group composed of eight 
firms emerges. This group is distinct from the aggressive 
acquirers group in that it has targeted retail and 
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conventional banking activities to fuel its growth, which is 
slower than aggressive acquirers group. It also funds its 
growth more by its deposit base as opposed to funding by fed 
funds by the aggressive acquirers group. 
The diversified regional group has the maximum number of 
new entries - five from the aggressive acquirers group firms 
slowing down and four from trust banks retreating back to 
their original group, reflecting inability to execute the 
highly focused and specialized trust banking strategy. First 
Interstate and Fleet/Norstar moved into this group from real 
estate oriented tier I, reflecting their efforts to diversify 
their asset base. On the other hand, the global group is 
exactly same, although its share of aggregate sample assets 
goes down from 57% to 51%, reflecting increasing heterogeneity 
in the industry. 
The aggressive acquirers group gained two new members 
(KeyCorp, and Suntrust) from the diversified regional group, 
while losing seven firms largely to the diversified regional 
group, reflecting slowing down by the firms. The remaining 
banks in the Aggressive acquirers group had a growth rate of 
nearly 100%. Finally, six banks moved into the specialized 
tier I group from the diversified regionals, indicating their 
failure to handle a diversified portfolio. Only one bank 
(Huntington) shifted from aggressive acquirers group to tier 
I group, reflecting a fundamental shift in its orientation 
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from wholesale to retail, although it still had a growth rate 
of 66%. 
5.3.4 Key Changes in 1986 (See Table 5.5 and Figure 5.4) 
The industry exhibits maximum strategic heterogeneity in 
this time period. For the only time in the fifteen horizon of 
this study the global group splits up losing three members 
(Manufacturer's Hanover, Continental and Bank of America) to 
a new group composed of retracting globals withdrawing from 
foreign markets and refocusing on domestic retail markets, and 
weakening regionals with bad loans and poor capitalization. 
Chase Manhattan moves into the trust group and Bank of Boston 
retracts into the diversified regionals. 
The aggressive acquirers group dissolves reflecting 
slowing down and imminent consolidation in the industry. The 
high growth retail oriented group remains largely stable, 
while picking up some members from the defunct Aggressive 
acquirers group. The trust group acquires six new members 
reflecting attempts by firms to duplicate this highly 
specialized and profitable strategy. Finally, while the 
regional groups are largely stable, a new group of troubled 
banks with a negative growth rate, high provisions, 
uncontrollable expenses, and below industry average 
capitalization emerges. 
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5.3.5 Key Changes in 1987 (See Table 5.6 and Figure 5.5) 
This SSTP starts the first in the series of two dramatic 
change processes in a retracting, consolidating industry, 
thrown into chaos by exogenous shocks. Three groups dissolve. 
The high growth and Real estate oriented tier I groups merge 
to form a single group. The global group regains its three 
members lost to the transient retracting global+weakening 
regional group. 
The troubled group undergoes a wholesale change, losing 
all its existing members and acquiring three new ones. The 
trust group again loses three members to diversified regional 
and the newly formed merged group. Finally, the diversified 
regionals is quite stable, except for absorbing five members 
from the dissolving global+weakening regional retracting 
group. 
5.3.6 Key Changes in 1988 (See Table 5.7 and Figure 5.6) 
The industry turns a full cycle after having gone through 
a tumultuous period. An increasing homogenization is visible, 
with three out of the four original groups from 1974-79 
reappearing. State Street is the only survivor, albeit a very 
successful one, in the trust group. The rest of three groups 
are quite well defined with a high degree of strategic 
distance between cluster centroids, showing a crystallization 
of the industry structure. 
97 
There is an apparent diffusion of market power in the 
industry with the global group only accounting for 38% of the 
sample assets as opposed to 58% before deregulation. 
5.4 Results of Hypothesis Testing 
HI: During periods of severe environmental discontinuity, 
there will be significantly greater inter-group mobility. 
Table 5.8 shows the net changes in the number of 
strategic groups in each time period. An inspection of this 
table shows that the maximum number of changes occurred in 
1980-82 and 1987 following the events which caused severe 
environmental shocks and discontinuity in the industry. These 
results support HI. 
H2: Environmental discontinuities will be associated with the 
observance of negative risk return relationships at the 
firm level. 
For testing the relationship between risk and return, a 
least squares regression analysis was performed. The average 
return on assets for each time period was regressed on the 
standard deviation of ROAA for that period. Following 
Fiegenbaum & Thomas (1990) , the standard deviation for single 
year SSTP's was computed by pooling them with the previous 
time period. ROAA was chosen as the representative performance 
indicator, because it is the most widely used industry 
performance measure. 
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Table 5.9 shows the R2 values and beta weights of 
regression analysis4. As can be seen, a negative relationship 
exists between risk and return in the banking industry at all 
time periods. However, the strength of this relationship 
increases during the second and fifth SSTPs - the two periods 
of severe environmental discontinuity, thereby providing some 
indirect support for the hypothesized impact of environmental 
discontinuity in altering risk-return relationships. Also, a 
pattern of increasing association is observable between risk- 
return after the deregulation, reflecting the fiscal 
discipline which market mechanisms and price decontrols have 
brought to this industry. 
H3A: Performance difference measured in economic terms will 
exist between strategic groups during stable strategic 
time periods. 
A multivariate analysis of variance was performed to test 
for performance differences across strategic groups in each 
time period. Table 5.10 shows the results of this analysis. 
4 It is recognized that due to impact of excluded variables, 
there is a serial correlation between the error term and dependent 
variable, which leads to the presence of seemingly unrelated 
regressions (Johnston, 1972 ; Zellner 1962) . Thus it would be more 
appropriate to perform a GLS regression instead of OLS to improve 
the efficiency of parameters. Unfortunately, GLS procedure is not 
available in the SPSS software package, and given the fact that we 
were interested only in the nature and not the strength of 
association, the complexity and time involved in transferring files 
to another software program did not justify performing a GLS 
regression. In general, the results from two procedures are quite 
similar (Cool & Schendel 1988) . 
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For 1987, PE ratios were excluded from the analysis since most 
banks made losses for that year, thereby rendering the price 
earnings multiples meaningless. Uniform support is found for 
this hypothesis at 99% confidence level in all time periods. 
However, the results of Univariate analysis on individual 
performance measures show that financial market measure - PE 
ratio is not significantly different across groups in four out 
of six time periods (see table 5.11) . 
H3B: Within each period of stable strategic group structure, 
strategic groups will exhibit different levels of risk. 
Table 5.10 also shows the results of testing for risk 
exposure across strategic groups. Risk was measured as the 
temporal standard deviation of each performance measure within 
each time period. For the three single year time periods, risk 
was measured by computing the standard deviations on the 
pooled data from 1980 to the period in question. Thus, for 
1986 the risk measures were based on six year data from 1980- 
86, while for 1988, they were based on eight years data from 
1980-88. This procedure of pooling data for entire post¬ 
deregulation period rather than lagging one SSTP at time was 
thought to be more reliable because of the high degree of 
turbulence in this industry. 
Significant risk differences were found across strategic 
groups at a .001 level of significance for three time periods 
and at .05 level of significance for two time periods. No 
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statistically significant differences were observed for 1983- 
85 time period. However, the results of univariate testing 
showed that except for 1987, no risk differences are observed 
between strategic groups on individual performance measures 
(see table 5.11) . 
H3C: Within each period of stable strategic group structure, 
strategic groups will exhibit dissimilar levels of risk- 
adjusted performance. 
Finally, the last facet of across group performance 
analysis involved testing for risk adjusted performance 
differences. As can be seen in table 5.10, MANOVA analysis 
showed that risk adjusted performance differences were present 
across strategic groups in the U.S. Banking industry only in 
1988. These results were corroborated by univariate ANOVAs as 
shown in table 5.11. 
H4: Firms belonging to the same strategic group will not 
realize similar performance levels. 
To examine performance differences within groups 
unaggregated data on each bank was matched with its cluster 
membership within each time period. Then each of these 
clusters/strategic groups were individually examined for risk 
and performance differences. First, an analysis of risk 
differences was conducted using the Bartlett's variance 
homogeneity test. Table 5.12 shows the results of this 
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analysis. An examination of this table shows that in 47 out of 
85 tests no risk differences existed within the strategic 
groups. Further analysis shows that while in the period 
before deregulation, only 27% of tests pointed to the 
existence of similar risk levels within strategic groups, this 
number increased to 46.6% in 1980-82, 77.7% in 1983-85, and 
then fell again to 52.4% in 1986, shooting to 90% in 1987 (as 
before, risk measures on the PE were not meaningful in this 
time period because of sharp losses), and finally dropping 
back to 44.4% in 1988. The increase in the similarity of risk 
level between the members of the same strategic group in the 
periods following deregulation shows the increased effect of 
strategic groups in the industry after deregulation. 
Then firm performance differences within each strategic 
group were examined using the analysis of variance. Since, the 
assumption of homogeneity of variance was violated for some 
groups, a nonparametric ANOVA - Kruskal Wallis was performed. 
Table 5.13 presents the results of this testing. The results 
for only the first three SSTPs are presented in this table, 
because it is impossible to execute either parametric or 
nonparametric analysis of variance for single year time 
periods, because of limited data points. A visual inspection 
and an examination of the dispersion of the performance values 
within strategic groups in the latter three SSTPs, indicated 
that the results are quite similar to the previous three time 
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periods. In other words, strong support is found for the 
hypothesized within group performance differences. 
H5: A model of intra industry performance difference that 
includes measures of firm capabilities together with 
strategic group membership as predictors will have more 
predictive validity (higher proportion of explained 
variance) than a model omitting capability measures. 
To test this hypothesis the 45 firms in the cross- 
sectional sample on which capability scores were available 
were assigned to group membership based on the results of 1988 
industry map - the most recent time period in the longitudinal 
sample. One firm in the cross-sectional sample (Midlantic 
Bancorp.) did not appear in the longitudinal sample ( it may be 
recalled that it was part of the original sample, but was 
dropped due to lack of data availability) , and consequently 
was dropped, resulting in a final sample of 44 firms. 
Forcing a reduced set of firms from the cross-sectional 
sample into 1988 clusters, may raise some questions about the 
validity of the procedure. However, a high degree of stability 
was observed among strategic group structures while performing 
cluster analysis on a reduced number of firms as discussed 
above. Hence, this procedure is deemed to be fairly reliable. 
A regression analysis was performed to test for the 
contribution of group membership and organizational resources 
in explaining variance in organizational performance in both 
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1988 and 1990 . The results are shown in tables 5.14A and 
5.14B. Since organizational resources were highly correlated, 
they were factor analyzed into two factors - assets and skills 
for the purpose of this analysis. Assets consisted of 
efficiency, risk management, adequacy of the capital base, and 
asset quality, while skills were composed of technological 
expertise, innovation, and placing power. Management quality 
and depth, franchise and information asymmetries split evenly 
on the both the factors. 
An examination of tables 5.14A and 5.14B, clearly shows 
that the addition of firm resources significantly adds to an 
explanation of intraindustry performance variation, thereby 
supporting hypothesis five. This relationship is more powerful 
in 1990 as opposed to 1988 in terms of the overall percentage 
of variation explained, because 1988 was an unusual year for 
the industry. This is because the industry was highly 
profitable in 1988 since banks had taken huge losses on their 
balance sheets the previous year to provide reserves for the 
LDC debt exposure. This "doctoring" of balance sheets coupled 
with a strong economy generated extraneous variance in the 
relationship between strategy, firm resource endowments, and 
performance. 
The fact that cluster membership is almost nonsignificant 
while resource variables are highly significant in 1990 is 
interesting. It suggests the increasing importance of 
resources in shaping competition in the industry, as also the 
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fact that strategic group membership in 1990 is not likely to 
be the same as in 1988. 
H6: Firm resource bundles can be employed to identify 
meaningful strategic groups, as measured by the 
assessments of industry observers. 
To this exploratory hypothesis expert panel ratings on 
the ten resource variables were pooled and cluster analyzed 
using similar procedures as outlined in the longitudinal 
analysis. A five cluster solution was obtained, which looked 
very different form the clustering solutions obtained by using 
scope and resource deployment variables. Figure 5.7 shows the 
results of this analysis, while table 5.15 presents the group 
means, standard deviations, the results of MANOVA testing on 
cluster centriods, and the ANOVAs on individual clustering 
dimensions. 
An inspection of table 5.15 shows that based on cluster 
centroids, group 2 is most well endowed group while group 5 is 
the least endowed. Their performance also follows a similar 
pattern, with group 2 being the "winners" and group 5 being 
the "losers". The rest of the three groups fall between these 
two extreme groups with group 1 being closer to group five, 
while groups three and four are more proximate to group two. 
It is interesting to observe that while all groups have 
strong franchises (above industry average), they don't have 
uniform capabilities to exploit those franchises. Again, 
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although group 4 has the highest placing power and a strong 
technological expertise (its coefficient of variation 
(mean/standard deviation) is 7.60 vs. 7.15 for group2) and 
innovation capability (c.v. of 10.08 vs. 7.29 for group2), it 
is not able to exploit/convert them into a significant 
competitive advantage. Perhaps its weak risk management 
capability coupled with its relative inefficiency and a 
moderate capital base prevent it from fully deploying its 
capabilities in other areas. 
Group 3 outperforms Group 4, but a comparison of the two 
reveals that they are quite similar in their resource 
configurations, with Group 4 scoring higher on some and 
group 3 on others. The key difference is between their risk 
management capability and asset quality. Indeed, risk 
management seems to be a core skill in this industry. While, 
I continue this analysis of the resource based strategic 
groups in the next chapter, a preliminary examination appears 
to show that some resources confer a disproportionate degree 
of competitive advantage in the banking industry, while some 
others seem to work only in combination with other resources. 
The meaningfulness of these groupings is hard to 
determine, given that they represent a fundamentally different 
way of conceptualizing industry competitive dynamics. However, 
the implications of this framework for strategic management 
are quite significant and is discussed in the next chapter. 
Members of the expert panel found them to be very interesting 
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and instructive, but not unexpected given the fact we had 
discussed the possibility of finding say J.P. Morgan and Bank 
One in the same group during my discussions with them. Their 
acceptance was certainly facilitated by the fact industry 
analysts increasingly view the industry competition as being 
denominated in terms of organizational skills (WSJ, Mar. 
23, 1991). The best and perhaps the sole quantitative or 
statistical method of determining the validity of these 
groupings is look at the percentage of differential 
performance across groups explained. This issue is 
investigated by hypothesis seven below. 
H7: Increased differential performance effects will be 
associated with resource based strategic groups, as 
compared to product market based groups. 
TO compare the percentage of performance variation across 
groups explained by the resource based groups with 
conventional product market strategy based groups, ANOVA tests 
were performed across strategic groups in all time periods to 
compute the R2 figures for each performance dimension in each 
time period. Table 5.16 presents the results of this analysis. 
As can be seen uniform support is found for this hypothesis 
across all three performance dimensions. 
5.5 Limitations 
The findings of this study should be evaluated in the 
light of the following limitations: First, the non-inclusion 
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of foreign banks, who constitute a significant competitive 
force particularly in the wholesale banking markets, is a 
clear limitation. These banks could not be included due to 
non-availability of data. It is not known whether they would 
form a different strategic group or belong to existing 
strategic groups, thereby inhibiting a fuller understanding of 
the strategic group phenomenon. 
Second, the measures of market based performance and risk 
are relatively weak. Future research should employ the CAPM 
model to get cumulative abnormal returns and betas - the 
market based assessment of performance. There is currently a 
debate going on between some scholars who question the whole 
mean variance approach to measuring risk (See Ruefli, 1990; 
Bromiley, 1991; and Ruefli, 1991) . It may be more appropriate 
to use the variation in analysts earning forecast available on 
the IBES database as a measure of risk. This measure could not 
be employed in this study since IBES does not report data as 
far back as 1974. 
Third, while the scope and resource deployment variable 
specification was quite rigorous, a further improvement in 
this process is possible in order to capture finer points of 
banking strategy. For example, the real estate portfolio might 
have been decomposed into commercial and residential 
components. Similarly, measures of contingent commitments and 
letters of credit outstanding might have captured "off balance 
sheet" activity - a significant dimension of competition in 
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the banking industry. Again, data limitations precluded the 
use of these variables. 
Fourth, while the overlying of a cross-sectional research 
design on a longitudinal research design is relatively novel, 
it should be recognized that the findings of this endeavor 
should be treated as purely exploratory. This is so, because 
there is a limited comparability between two samples in terms 
of membership and time period. 
Finally, this study is subject to the problem of 
generalizability inherent in all single industry studies. The 
relative correspondence of the results with findings from 
previous single industry studies (especially Fiegenbaum's 
(1987) insurance industry study) inspires some confidence, 
however. This leads one to speculate that similar phenomenon 
may be observed in other financial services industries, in 
particular, and service industries in general. 
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Table 5.1 Identification of SSTP's 
Period # Years F value Significant Industry Events 
1974-76 6 1.43 (.009) 
1980-82 3 1.89 (.000) Passage of Depository 
Institutions Deregulation 
and Monetary Control Act 
1983-85 3 1.53 (.007) Passage of Garn St. 
Germain Act 1982 
1986 1 1.92 (.000) Lagged effect of Mexican 
Debt Rescheduling 
1987 1 3.65 (.000) LDC debt crises 
1988 1 2.11 (.000) Unusally healthy year for 
the recuperating industry 
Notes: 1.) F values for the Box's M test. 
2.) The values in the parentheses indicate the 
significance level. 
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Table 5.2 Strategic groups in the Period 1974-1979: MANOVA 
and ANOVA test results, group centroids and standard 
deviations (in parentheses). 
STRATEGY 
VARIABLE 
MANOVA F(Wilks) = 14.424 (p = 0.000) 
SGI SGII SGIII SGIV F(ANOVA) 
(n=13) (n=ll) (n=20) (n=24) 
RE 15.85 4.87 10.0 19.68 45.6(0.000) 
(3.28) (2.45) (2.98) (6.69) 
Cl 18.19 16.89 19.21 19.16 1.1 (0.370) 
(3.93) (3.84) (4.65) (3.82) 
DEM 42.44 26.76 42.71 33.48 25.5(0.000) 
(3.08) (7.67) (5.87) (8.20) 
TIM 31.72 69.59 44.66 44.35 64.4(0.000) 
(7.18) (8.03) (6.03) (6.54) 
FOREXP 0.63 33.44 9.62 2.78 133.0(0.000) 
(1.09) (6.43) (6.20) (2.73) 
NIR 12.47 23.50 21.06 12.50 34.1(0.000) 
(2.71) (5.10) (3.69) (3.90) 
LEV 1.24 0.64 0.85 0.99 2.7(0.053) 
(0.45) (0.21) (0.35) (0.76) 
NPF 5.24 7.20 10.71 6.59 10.0(0.000) 
(2.18) (3.68) (3.49) (2.84) 
GROWTH 10.11 14.52 8.85 9.09 5.54(0.002) 
(2.62) (6.13) (4.12) (3.30) 
CS 26.44 15.58 21.07 21.37 19.12(0.000) 
(2.50) (2.43) (4.43) (3.53) 
PROV 0.36 0.36 0.32 0.33 0.35(0.793) 
(0.10) (0.11) (0.17) (0.16) 
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Table 5.3 Strategic groups in the Period 1980-82: 
MANOVA and ANOVA test results, group centroids 
and standard deviations (in parentheses). 
STRATEGY 
VARIABLE 
MANOVA F (Wilks) - 3.S25 (o- 0.000) 
SGI SGII SGIII SGIV SGV F (ANOVA) 
(n-10) (n-15) (n-22) (n-14) (n-7) 
RE 5.39 12.39 14.66 21.38 10.34 19.79(0.000) 
(3.95) (3.39) (4.31) (5.30) (4.19) 
Cl 16.92 24.19 20.67 24.47 20.75 2.82 (0.032) 
(5.65) (4.73) (3.87) (5.76) (5.71) 
DEM 17.84 25.46 35.95 24.57 27.93 29.25(0.000) 
(5.38) (3.50) (6.64) (3.90) (3.48) 
TIM 79.82 55.76 43.30 51.35 57.30 84.64(0.000) 
(5.98) (4.50) (6.59) (3.35) (5.94) 
FOREX? 36.77 8.31 2.93 3.52 20.90 129.4(0.000) 
(3.44) (4.75) (3.64) (3.82) (5.71) 
NIR 26.70 23.59 18.73 15.84 27.94 9.50 (0.000) 
(6.91) (5.64) (8 .22) (3.17) (3.99) 
LEV 0.46 0.91 0.72 0.85 0.58 1.62 (0.181) 
(0.17) (0.77) (0.38) (0.56) (0.35) 
NPF 8.79 12.29 11.88 7.92 12.63 3.93 (0.007) 
(3.73) (4.56) (4.02) (2.67) (2.38) 
GROWTH 10.15 17.99 10.79 9.01 10.50 4.80 (0.002) 
(6.86) (7.08) (6.27) (4.61) (3.36) 
CS 9.94 13.91 17.85 15.35 12.45 22.62(0.000) 
(1.69) (2.21) (2.62) (1.37) (3.03) 
?ROV 0.31 0.28 0.29 0.43 0.25 4.16 (0.005) 
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.19) (0.03) 
112 
Table 5.4 Strategic groups in the Period 1983-85: 
MANOVA and ANOVA test results, group centroids 
and standard deviations (in parentheses). 
STRATEGY 
VARIABLE 
MANOVA F lilies) - 8.829 io = 0 
SGI SGII SGI11 SGIV SGV SGVI 
(n-10)(n-il)(n-7)(n-20)(a-17)(a-3) 
.000) 
F (ANCVA) 
RE 7.11 12.37 17.74 13.27 19.66 6.13 
(4.94) (3.67) (3.71) (3.53) (6.00) (2.53) 
9.52 (0.000) 
Cl 17.90 25.78 21.25 25.75 25.01 17.53 
(8.49) (4.57) (3.73) (5.10) (6.23) (4.37) 
4.17 (0.002) 
DEM 17.46 23.11 30.74 24.94 23.37 37.04 
(5.24) (2.77) (6.31) (6.30) (5.03) (12.49) 
7.43 (0.000) 
TIM 79.49 55.95 37.67 50.15 44.36 46.74 
(5.34) (9.26) (7.33) (8.15) (5.36) (1.52) 
42.38 (0.000) 
FOREX? 34.14 4.79 2.38 9.97 1.92 6.78 
(4.75) (3.96) (2.50) (7.50) (2.52) (6.17) 
58.08 (0.000) 
KIR 25.49 20.48 16.88 22.53 16.53 37.55 
(9.50) (4.20) (3.54) (4.75) (4.55) (5.38) 
3.37 (0.000) 
LEV 0.44 0.82 0.90 0.58 0.81 0.36 
(0.18) (0.52) (0.38) (0.38) (0.43) (0.48) 
2.12 (0.074) 
N?F 8.17 13.72 9.27 11.45 3.55 15.42 
(4.10) (6.15) (3.10) (3.37) (3.55) (4.45) 
3.09 (0.015) 
GROWTH 6.41 33.31 29.50 11.59 10.47 11.34 
(7.92) (9.52) (3.11) (4.15) (5.33) (7.15) 
26.62 (0.000) 
CS 15.07 18.58 20.94 18.47 20.31 19.93 
(3.72) (2.17) (2.10) (2.54) (2.33) (1.90) 
7.30 (0.300) 
PRCV 0.59 0.37 0.29 0.45 0.57 0.38 
(0.37) (0.11) (0.11)(0.19)(0.22) (0.30) 
2.69 (0.029) 
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Table 5.5 Strategic groups in the Period 1986: 
MANOVA and ANOVA test results, group centroids 
and standard deviations (in parentheses). 
STRATEGY 
VARIABLE 
MANOVA F(Wilks) = 10.114 (0.000) 
SGI SGII SGIII SGIV SGV SGVI SGVII 
(n=8) (n=18) <n=10)(n=9)(n=5) (n=13)(n=5) 
F(ANOVA) 
RE 11.97 16.40 24.82 10.15 7.35 13.67 22.95 
(5.19) (4.62) (9.21) (4.20) (6.84) (3.17) (3.16) 
9.34(0.000) 
Cl 26.95 27.91 25.76 18.91 11.89 28.19 25.94 
(5.11) (5.61) (6.25) (5.49) (5.93) (4.59) (6.00) 
5.96(0.000) 
DEM 22.50 24.31 24.51 32.47 17.67 27.48 23.99 
(4.26) (4.76) (6.41) (13.58) (6.93) (4.83) (4.48) 
3.52 (0.005) 
TIM 77.50 38.64 35.43 42.38 77.96 72.52 45.07 
(4.26) (4.42) (5.37) (6.37) (7.45) (4.83) (9.23) 
67.2 (0.000) 
FOREXP 14.08 1.83 2.35 14.02 32.98 4.74 1.62 
(10.9) (1.99) (3.14) (11.6) (3.25) (5.16) (1.59) 
19.1 (0.000) 
NIR 22.13 15.80 15.97 30.20 35.78 19.60 20.87 
(2.94) (3.05) (3.77) (10.2) (6.84) (3.19) (2.41) 
19.3 (0.000) 
LEV 0.39 1.36 0.78 0.80 0.67 0.76 0.62 
(0.34) (0.78) (0.55) (0.34) (0.39) (0.55) (0.38) 
2.05 (0.072) 
NPF 10.73 9.97 9.37 9.90 9.64 11.57 9.94 
(7.29) (4.93) (6.25) (4.58) (5.89) (4.96) (1.92) 
0.22 (0.969) 
GROWTH 2.94 16.00 52.52 11.82 9.75 24.67 -5.00 
(7.67) (7.12) (12.3) (5.29) (5.34) (9.04) (7.85) 
37.7 (0.000) 
CS 26.43 24.91 25.16 24.79 19.00 24.79 36.46 
(5.24) (2.25) (2.18) (3.57) (6.16) (4.30) (6.40) 
9.46 (0.000) 
PROV 0.97 0.51 0.49 0.54 0.66 0.57 1.95 
(0.61) (0.21) (0.22) (0.28) (0.39) (0.26) (0.99) 
10.5(0.000) 
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Table 5.6 Strategic groups in the Period 1987: MANOVA 
and ANOVA test results, group centroids and standard 
deviations (in parentheses). 
STRATEGY 
VARIABLE 
MANOVA F(Wilks) = 
SGI SGII SGIII 
(n=l9) (n=32) (n=3) 
12.649 (p= 0.000) 
SGIV SGV F(ANOVA) 
(n=6) (n=8) 
RE 14.43 
(4.69) 
22.64 
(8.56) 
18.93 12.19 8.87 
(6.27) (4.90) (6.46) 
5.5(0.000) 
Cl 27.19 
(5.24) 
25.12 
(6.14) 
27.67 
(2.96) 
18.70 15.92 
(5.18) (9.18) 
5.6(0.000) 
DEM 22.24 
(4.14) 
20.86 
(4.36) 
23.35 
(6.11) 
29.12 16.44 
(14.45) (5.56) 
3.6(0.007) 
TIM 77.76 
(4.14) 
43.46 
(6.49) 
69.45 
(10.21) 
46.83 80.47 
(7.18) (4.85) 
102.4(0.000) 
FOREXP 4.64 
(4.92) 
2.34 
(2.30) 
4.98 
(3.73) 
19.20 31.62 
(10.18) (5.54) 
53.3 (0.000) 
NIR 20.15 
(3.79) 
16.36 
(3.83) 
22.31 
(6.46) 
32.76 33.34 
(11.70) (6.91) 
18.6 (0.000) 
LEV 0.72 
(0.52) 
1.00 
(0.80) 
0.41 
(0.51) 
0.84 0.57 
(0.39) (0.37) 
1.0 (0.417) 
NPF 10.70 
(4.78) 
10.09 
(3.81) 
10.88 
(4.39) 
9.98 7.19 
(5.59) (5.26) 
70.6(0.000) 
GROWTH 10.04 
(11.76) 
25.07 -12.58 
(34.09) (5.09) 
9.66 3.84 
(11.54) (11.84) 
2.3 (0.058) 
CS 26.57 
(3.49) 
29.58 
(5.19) 
49.68 
(10.24) 
33.00 31.52 
(3.86) (7.94) 
10.7 (0.000) 
PROV 0.81 
(0.48) 
1.01 
(0.64) 
3.91 
(1.90) 
1.56 2.00 
(0.77) (0.84) 
13.0 (0.000) 
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Table 5.7 Strategic groups in the Period 1966: MA2JOVA 
ar.d A2I0VA test results, group centroids and standard 
deviations (in parentheses). 
STPATEGY 
VARIABLE 
MANOVA F(Wilks) = 32.076 (p=0.000) 
SGI SGII SGIII SGIV F (A2IOVA) 
(n=19) (n=38) (n=10) (n=l) 
P-Zl 17.32 21.68 11.53 2.68 4.85(0.004) 
(4.63) (9.34) (7.83) (0.00) 
Cl 28.41 25.10 15.35 15.61 9.02(0.000) 
(5.89) (6.26) (8.71) (0.00) 
LEM 21.67 20.41 17.20 51.51 19.4(0.000) 
(4.49) (4.38) (5.83) (4.64) 
TIM 78.33 46.63 75.06 48.49 86.7(0.000) 
(4.49) (7.15) (12.26) (0.00) 
ELPZX? 4.86 2.67 28.69 13.49 120.2(0.000) 
(4.44) (3.08) (5.21) (0.00) 
:;ir 19.82 18.33 33.10 55.09 27.0(0.000) 
(4.20) (6.56) (7.21) (0.00) 
LEV 0.59 0.93 0.47 0.44 1.80(0.156) 
(0.52) (0.93) (0.47) (0.00) 
!??F 8.60 9.64 7.03 21.09 3.78(0.015) 
(4.00) (4.49) (5.42) (0.00) 
GROWTH 8.56 9.33 1.46 20.37 1.70(0.175) 
(8.76) (10.5) (6.12) (0.00) 
CS 23.93 24.64 18.51 27.58 6.49(0.001) 
(5.41) (3.63) (5.26) (0.00) 
PROV 0.48 0.55 0.40 0.22 1.51(0.219) 
(0.27) (0.23) (0.30) (0.00) 
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Table 5.8 Net changes in strategic groups 
1974-79 
SSTP 
1980-82 1983-85 1986 1987 1988 
No. Of 
strategic 
groups 4 5 6 7 5 4 
New 
strategic 
groups — 2 1 2 1 0 
Strategic 
groups 
dissolved 1 0 1 3 1 
Total 
change 
index 3 1 3 4 1 
Table 5.9 Firm level risk-return regression analysis 
Time Period R* F-statistic Beta T-value 
1974-79 0.186 15.054* -0.431 -3.880* 
1980-82 0.284 26.116* -0.532 -5.110* 
1983-85 0.518 70.923* -0.720 -8.422* 
1986 0.467 57.768* -0.683 -7.601* 
1987 0.951 1269.1* -0.975 -35.63* 
1988 0.080 5.622** -0.282 -2.371** 
* p<.001; ** p<.05. 
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Table 5.10 Strategic groups and performance differences: 
MANOVA results for each performance dimension 
Stable Strategic Time Period 
Performance I II III IV V VI 
Dimension 1974-79 1980-82 1983-85 1986 1987 1988 
Economic 7.84*** 6.40*** 3.52*** 6.35*** 7 .76*** 6.18*** 
Risk 3.43*** 1.92* 1.60 1.87* 13.7*** 3.83*** 
Risk 1.40 0.85 0.98 0.82 1.13 2.64** 
Adjusted 
Notes: 
1. F(Wilks) values and their significance levels are shown 
in the table. 
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05. 
2. The analysis for 1987 does not include PE ratios. 
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Table 5.11 Strategic groups and performance differences: 
ANOVA results for individual performance 
measures 
Period ROAA PE PPE 
Economic Performance Levels 
1974-79 2.81 (0.046) 0.82 (0.487) 5.72 (0.002) 
1980-82 3.99 (0.006) 1.98 (0.109) 6.54 (0.000) 
1983-85 3.87 (0.004) 0.86 (0.511) 0.70 (0.625) 
1986 4.59 (0.001) 0.60 (0.731) 11.6 (0.000) 
1987 17.2 (0.000) — — — 15.9 (0.000) 
1988 0.44 (0.724) 13.6 (0.000) 0.59 (0.625) 
Risk Exposure 
1974-79 2.47 (0.070) 0.78 (0.509) 3.94 (0.012) 
1980-82 1.72 (0.157) 1.60 (0.186) 1.57 (0.193) 
1983-85 1.37 (0.249) 0.66 (0.653) 1.91 (0.107) 
1986 1.70 (0.137) 0.49 (0.812) 1.44 (0.215) 
1987 15.7 (0.000) — — — 16.1 (0.000) 
1988 0.59 (0.627) 0.55 (0.652) 4.66 (0.005) 
Risk- -Adjusted Performance 
1974-79 1.12 (0.349) 1.60 (0.197) 0.44 (0.728) 
1980-82 0.96 (0.599) 0.79 (0.537) 0.89 (0.477) 
1983-85 0.44 (0.816) 1.86 (0.114) 0.73 (0.606) 
1986 0.72 (0.791) 0.37 (0.896) 1.07 (0.392) 
1987 0.53 (0.471) — — — 1.53 (0.224) 
1988 2.99 (0.037) 5.68 (0.002) 3.28 (0.027) 
Notes: 
1. F values and their significance levels (in parentheses) are 
shown in the table. 
2. The analysis for the year 1987 does not include the PE 
ratios. 
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Table 5.12 Analysis of within group performance differences on 
individual performance measures (Kruskall-Wallace 
one-way ANOVA) 
SSTP Strategic Group X2 (Significance of X2 
ROAA PE PPE 
1974-79 SGI 48.1 ( . 000) 36.5 (.000) 42.7 (.000) 
SG2 54.4 (.000) 33.5(.000) 55.4 (.000) 
SG3 80.2 (.000) 34.6 (. 000) 94.6 (.000) 
SG4 110.6 (.000) 62.0 (.000) 107.4 (.000) 
1980-82 SGI 22.8 (.007) 19.8 (.019) 21.7 (.010) 
SG2 34.1 (.002) 31.6(.005) 39.5 (.000) 
SG3 38.5 (.Oil) 48.3 (. 000) 42.8 (.003) 
SG4 35.9 (. 000) 16.8 (.207) 35.4 (.000) 
SG5 16.4 (.012) 16.3 (. 012) 17.2 (.009) 
1983-85 SGI 27.1 (.001) 20.2 (.017) 23.9(.005) 
SG2 23.9 (.004) 12.1 (.207) 23.6 (. 005) 
SG3 20.1(.005) 10.9 (. 142) 16.5 (. 021) 
SG4 44.8 (.000) 22.3 (.173) 46.0 (.000) 
SG5 43.4 (.001) 30.1 (.036) 40.5 (. 002) 
SG6 7.20(.027) 6.49 (.039) 5.96 (.051) 
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Table 5.13 Comparison of risk differences between members of the 
same strategic group (Bartlett-Box'M F-test) 
Period Strategic 
Group 
F-value 
SROAA 
(significance 
SPE 
of F) 
SPPE 
1974-79 SGI 3.4(.003) 2.7 (.012) 1.5 (. 159) 
SG2 3.2 (.000) 1.4 (.173) 2.3(.009) 
SG3 1.6 (.042) 10.4 ( . 000) 1.1 (.342) 
SG4 3.1 (.000) 2.2 (.001) 1.5 (. 049) 
1980-82 SGI 1.7(.095) 2.8 (.003) 2.4 (.012) 
SG2 1.3 (.184) 2.4 (.002) 1.1 (.339) 
SG3 3.2(.000) 3.6 (. 000) 2.3 (. 001) 
SG4 2.0 (.019) 8.2 (.000) 1.2 (.258) 
SG5 0.9 (. 488) 0.8 (.560) 5.5 (.770) 
1983-85 SGI 1.8 (.072) 3.6 (.000) 2.5 (. 008) 
SG2 1.2 (.301) 0.1 (1.00) 0.9 (. 489) 
SG3 0.5(.817) 1.4 (.201) 0.5(.864) 
SG4 1.2 (.301) 1.6 (.071) 1.3(.185) 
SG5 2.2(.003) 2.4 (.002) 1.5(.102) 
SG6 1.2 (.293) 1.4 (.249) 0.3 (. 769) 
1986 SGI 1.1 (.354) 4.5 (. 000) 1.3 (.269) 
SG2 2.5 (.001) 2.9(.000) 0.8 (.691) 
SG3 1.4 (.198) 0.6 (. 809) 0.7 (. 698) 
SG4 2.8(.005) 2.1 (.039) 0.9 (.504) 
SG5 3.2 (.014) 3.6 (. 007) 2.9 (.021) 
SG6 2.1 (.014) 1.3(.190) 1.7 (.057) 
SG7 1.6(.171) 8.5(.000) 0.9 (.447) 
1987 SGI 1.4 (.150) — 1.5 (. 116) 
SG2 1.6 (.033) — 0.9 (. 551) 
SG3 0.5(.593) — 0.6 (.569) 
SG4 1.0(.453) — 1.1 (.349) 
SG5 0.4 (.918) — 0.4 (.901) 
1988 SGI 2.1 (.008) 7.7(.000) 1.6 (.054) 
SG2 1.6 (.028) 2.6(.000) 0.9 (. 665) 
SG3 0.4 (.910) 3.1(.007) 0.9 (.510) 
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Table 5.14 Regression analysis of cluster membership and firm 
resources on performance variables. 
A) Regression analysis of cluster membership and firm 
resources on 1988 performance variables. 
Performance 
Variable 
Overall 
R2 
F(value) Incremental 
Contribution of 
Assets & Skills 
to R2 
Significance 
(F-value) 
ROAA . 162 2.782** .080 2.152* 
PPE .350 7.187*** .091 2.908** 
PE .138 2.238* .132 3.069** 
* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.001 
B) Regression analysis of cluster membership and 
resources on 1990 performance variables. 
firm 
Performance 
Variable 
Overall 
R2 
F(value) Incremental 
Contribution of 
Assets & Skills 
to R2 
Significance 
(F-value) 
ROAA .643 13.700*** .599 31.94*** 
PPE .644 24.18*** .589 33.12*** 
PE .280 5.197** .260 7.239** 
** p<.01; *** p<.001 
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Table 5.15 Resource based strategic groups: MANOVA and ANOVA 
test results; cluster centroids and standard deviations 
Resource 
Variable 
MANOVA; 
SGI SGII 
(n=13) (n=13) 
F(Wilks)= 
SGI 11 
(n=7) 
6.17 (p=. 
SGIV 
(n=7) 
000) 
SGV 
(n=5) 
F(ANOVA) 
MQD 3.91 
(.323) 
5.92 
( .615) 
5.20 
( . 624) 
4.86 
(.468) 
4.72 
( .430) 
46.4(.000) 
FRAN 4.44 
(.538) 
5.81 
(.444) 
5.32 
(.550) 
5.20 
(.773) 
4.71 
( .607) 
10.4(.000) 
AQ 3.34 
(.488) 
5.84 
(.759) 
4.83 
(.486) 
3.48 
( .600) 
2.04 
( .402) 
52.9(.000) 
TE 3.85 
(.477) 
5.56 
(.778) 
4.32 
(.468) 
5.12 
(.674) 
3.28 20.9(.000) 
(.311) 
PP 4.08 
(.727) 
4.99 
(.836) 
4.16 
(.167) 
5.00 
( .408) 
3.19 9 
(.572) 
.36(.000) 
CAPB 3.81 
(.575) 
6.08 
(.673) 
4.75 
(.588) 
4.12 
(1.01) 
2.31 
(.775) 
32.1(.000) 
EFF 3.96 
(.515) 
5.67 
(.526) 
5.16 
(.325) 
4.36 
( . 866) 
3.55 
(1.10) 
17.1(.000) 
I NOV 3.84 
(.402) 
5.50 
(.754) 
4.22 
( .279) 
5.06 
(.502) 
3.26 
(.611) 
23.8(.000) 
RM 3.71 
(.433) 
5.99 
( .552) 
5.16 
(.317) 
3.90 
(.456) 
2.13 
( .533) 
79.5(.000) 
IA 4.02 
(.220) 
5.61 
(.421) 
4.47 
(.293) 
4.57 
( .485) 
3.32 
(.238) 
53.3(.000) 
AVERAGE 
MQD FRAN AQ TE PP CAPB EFF I NOV RM IA 
4.72 5.12 4.17 4.55 4.40 4.49 4.66 4.50 4.45 4.56 
(1.14)(.768)(1.42)(1.01)(.870)(1.38)(1.01)(.969)(1.35)(.835) 
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Table 5.16 ANOVA - R2 fit for individual performance 
measures 
SSTP ROA F- -value PE F- -value PPE F- value 
1974- -79 .116 2 .812 .037 0, .821 .212 5. 724 
( .046) ( .487) (. 002) 
1980- -82 .202 3, .993 . 112 1, .977 .293 6. 540 
( .006) (. .109) (. 000) 
1983- -85 .238 3, .869 .064 0. .863 .053 0. 701 
(■ .004) (. .511) (. 625) 
1986 .320 4. .890 .051 0. .538 .444 7. 999 
(. .000) (■ .778) (. 000) 
1987 .386 5. .786 .367 6. 162 
(. .000) (• 000) 
1988 .021 0. .442 .028 0. .588 .402 13 .68 
(• .724) (. .625) (. 000) 
Resource 
based 
groups .594 14.27 
(.000) 
.336 4. 
(■ 
.928 
.003) 
.509 10 
(. 
.09 
000) 
Notes: 1.) Numbers in parentheses are the significance 
levels of F-Values. 
2.) PE values for 1987 are not meaningful. 
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Chapter VI 
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
In this chapter the empirical results relating to the 
four research questions and their associated hypotheses are 
discussed and analyzed in the context of the U.S. banking 
industry. An attempt is made to integrate the findings and 
discussion with the existing strategic group research and draw 
the comparative as well as the unique implications of this 
theses for strategic management research in general and the 
strategic groups stream in particular. 
6.1 Research Question 1 
What are the dynamic patterns of strategic group 
formation and movement over a period of time? What is the 
impact of discontinuous environmental change on inter group 
mobility and firm risk return relationships? 
This question really is composed of two separate parts. 
They are discussed separately. The first part does not lend 
itself to formal hypotheses testing, therefore a comparative 
descriptive approach is employed for its analysis. Two 
previous studies: the pharmaceutical industry study by Cool 
(1985), and the insurance industry study by Fiegenbaum (1987), 
which performed more or less similar longitudinal analysis are 
used for comparing the changes in competitive patterns in the 
132 
dankl ¥11 
# 
Hcverer, it. should be 
exit logically superior 
r:icr:us and ir.itstry 
It rata 711 rr :tr dynasties are associated with three kind 
chatter three, change in greet strategy is captured by the 
methodology err1tyec fer tdenttfteatten cf SSI?s . An analysis 
if rintercrave patterns in the banking industry fren 1974-88 
rtdrraced that the fifteen year period was characterized by 
sez suc-ter1its cf varying duration in which strategic groups 
Ctrl found fcur sui-peneds cf seven, five, four, and 
three years duration fren 1963-62 in pharmaceutical industry, 
while riegehcaun found nine suh-pericds (five single year, and 
four double year) fren 1970-84 in the insurance industry. The 
pattern cf declining length cf SSl?s observed in this study is 
similar to Cool's study, while the presence of single year 
tine periods parallels Fiegenbaum's findings in the insurance 
industry. 
A central debate in strategic management concerns the 
role of exogenous environmental changes versus endogenous 
strategic choice initiatives in triggering strategic change 
133 
(Mascarenhas, 1989). Although the methodology employed to 
identify stable sub-periods within fifteen year study 
horizons, was statistical, its corroboration by significant 
preceding industry events as detailed in table 5.1, enhances 
the validity of the procedure. At the same time, it lends 
support to the environmental determinism perspective which 
contends that environmental shifts drive strategy changes that 
may result in changes in group strategy. This issue is further 
explored in the discussion of impact of discontinuous change 
on inter-group mobility. A discussion of the changes in number 
of strategic groups and firm membership - the other two types 
of strategic group dynamics follows next. 
The number of existing strategic groups changed from 
one period to next. In the period before deregulation, four 
strategic groups were identified as characterizing strategic 
asymmetry in the banking industry. This number increased to 
five and six respectively in the next two time periods which 
coincided with two successive deregulation initiatives. In the 
fourth time period maximum strategic heterogeneity was 
observed as the number of strategic groups went up to seven, 
before shrinking to five and four respectively in the last two 
time periods. 
Despite these dynamic changes in the strategic group 
structure, three core strategic patterns seemed to 
characterize competition in the banking industry over the 
entire study horizon. These are the global multirisk group. 
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the diversified regionals group, and the real estate oriented 
tier I regionals. This lends support to Fiegenbaum and 
Thomas's speculation that "there are long-term structural 
equilibria in terms of strategic group positions, but that, in 
the short term, environmental discontinuities, disturbances, 
and strategic repositionings create the need to search for 
new, more sustainable competitive positions" (1990:212). 
In terms of firm mobility, a high degree of membership 
change was observed between each time period, as firms 
attempted to reposition themselves to take advantage of the 
perceived opportunities afforded by deregulation, as also to 
learn about their comparative strategic advantages. This 
behavior can be attributed to both strategic change and 
strategic adjustment (Snow & Hambrick, 1980). Huntington's 
fundamental decision to move from wholesale banking to retail 
banking is an illustration of strategic change, while Chase's 
move to trust banking in 1986 and 1987 and its return to the 
global group and Chemical's constant repositioning are 
examples of short term strategic adjustment. 
Finally, some strategic groups witnessed a greater 
membership stability than others. As can be observed from 
figures 5.1 to 5.6, the global group was fairly stable across 
time periods except for 1986. A notable stability was also 
observed in the diversified regional group. This may be due to 
superior mobility barriers protecting these groups which 
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prevent entry into the group, while at their same acting as 
exit barriers for incumbents within the group. 
A comparison of these results with Cool (1985) and 
Fiegenbaum (1987) , suggests similarities in the dynamic 
pattern of group formation. First, as in the pharmaceutical 
industry, the banking industry returned to its original number 
of strategic groups after having undergone a structural 
transformation. However, an important distinction exists in 
that while Cool found six, five, four and six groups in the 
four time periods, i.e. a reduction in strategic asymmetry 
before returning to the original level, this study found 
exactly the opposite - an increase in strategic asymmetry 
before reverting to the original number. 
Second, as in the insurance industry (Fiegenbaum (1987), 
three core positions seemed to persist over the entire fifteen 
year period. A similar finding was reported by Lewis and 
Thomas (1990) and Mascarenhas (1989) . Third, a high degree of 
firm mobility and differential membership stability of 
strategic groups is consistent with Cool's findings. Cool 
attributed this firm mobility to a leader-follower phenomenon, 
where the strategic group members followed the strategy change 
of the firm altering its strategy first. In the banking 
industry some sort of a "herd mentality" is clearly apparent, 
where the firms changed groups more on a adhoc and 
nonsystematic basis, thereby making it difficult to establish 
a leader-follower phenomenon. Theoretical and empirical 
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exploration of the apparent differences between firm mobility 
patterns in these two studies, is a promising avenue for 
future research. 
Relating these findings to the questions of existence and 
stability of strategic groups outlined at the beginning of the 
study, the following observations can be made. First, since 
strategic groups persisted during the entire fifteen year 
period of this study, it can be inferred that strategic groups 
are not a random phenomenon in the U.S. banking industry. 
Further, the fact that strategic groups were found both before 
and after deregulation shows that strategic groups generically 
characterize competition, thereby lending support to 
Fiegenbaum and Thomas assertion that "strategic groups are a 
relatively stable, integral characteristic of industry 
structure" (1990: 212). However, it must be emphasized that 
this statement is largely conjectural. Until these findings 
are replicated in a large and diverse population of industries 
using multiple methodologies, the question of existence 
remains open5. 
Second, limited support is found for the stability of 
strategic groups. A longitudinal analysis of strategic groups 
revealed that although three core groups persisted over the 
fifteen year study period, changes in strategic group 
membership occurred quite frequently and the degree of 
5 For a detailed theoretical exploration of relationship 
between the nature of industry structure and the characteristics of 
strategic groups, see Mehra and Floyd (1992). 
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membership stability differed across strategic groups. This 
finding is consistent with the results of both Cool (1985) and 
Fiegenbaum (1987), and is an expression of the dynamic aspects 
of competitive strategy (Cool, 1985). An alternative 
explanation, which questions the validity of employing scope 
and resource deployment variables for group identification, is 
advanced in the next chapter. 
Before leaving the discussion of strategic group 
dynamics, one final point needs to made regarding the validity 
of the underlying clustering solutions. Thomas and Venkatraman 
(1988) have called for doing more confirmatory clustering 
rather than exploratory clustering. It is not clear however, 
as to what is gained by confirmatory clustering, other than 
establishing the robustness of the clustering algorithm. There 
is hardly anything interesting or enlightening about strategic 
groups which corroborate industry wisdom rather than 
complement it. Also not only is this clearly problematic in a 
longitudinal study, it may not be very desirable either, since 
the whole intent is to capture shifting strategic 
repositioning6. 
To the extent that the purpose of clustering is to 
validate the procedure itself, it is encouraging to note that 
the cluster solution of 1988, is very much in tune with the 
6 I do appreciate the underlying spirit of Thomas and 
Venkatraman's (1988) call, though, which is to combine more 
industry understanding with methodological rigor in performing 
strategic groups analysis, particularly given the fact that most 
extant research has been "data-driven" (Mcgee & Thomas, 1986). 
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current industry wisdom, and was expected a priori. Most 
industry analysts recognize the banking industry to be 
composed of four major groups - the money center banks 
(comparable to global multirisk cluster), the super regionals 
(comparable to diversified regionals), the tier I regionals 
and the trust banks. The correspondence of the statistical 
results with the "real picture", should substantially enhance 
the validity of the findings and is indicative of the 
robustness of the results. 
Left out of this scheme are the community banks which are 
not captured in this study due to the nature of the sample 
employed. Another apparent anomaly is the classification of 
Bank of America in the global banking group. Some industry 
analysts regard Bank of America as more of a super regional in 
its strategic makeup (Bryan, 1988) . A similar finding was 
reported by Mehra (1990) in a pilot study. 
This example raises an important conceptual point. Firms 
within a strategic group can differ in their strategic makeup, 
however usually they are more similar to each other than to 
firms in other groups. Although the group descriptions are 
based on cluster centroids, a more accurate picture is 
obtained by looking at group means and standard deviations 
which signify internal dispersion, simultaneously. In other 
words, a strategic group is akin to a "web", with firms in the 
group following similar and not exactly same strategies, 
thereby retaining some individual differences in the fine 
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tuning of their strategic postures rather than a "platter" 
with firms sitting on top of each other, and having congruent 
strategic configurations. 
This concludes the descriptive analysis of the incidence 
of strategic groups, changes in number of strategic groups, 
and changes in strategic group membership for the U.S. Banking 
industry. Next, we turn our attention to understanding the 
impact of discontinuous environmental change on inter-group 
mobility and risk-return relationship. 
6.1.2 Impact of Discontinuous Environment on Inter-Group 
Mobility 
To assess the impact of environmental discontinuities 
on inter group mobility and strategic repositioning, it is 
important to distinguish between two very different kinds of 
environmental discontinuities, which seem to generate 
contrasting response patterns. The first occurred in 1980, 
leading to significant deregulation in the industry, and 
altering the competitive "rules of the game". To a large 
extent, this regulatory initiative was introduced to level the 
playing field between commercial banks and other financial 
institutions. It was anticipated, and considered desirable by 
the industry. I label this change process as benevolent 
change. 
The second discontinuity occurred in 1987 - the LDC debt 
crises. It was drastic, unprecedented, and almost unexpected. 
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It threw the whole industry into state of chaos, and left a 
permanent scar on the industry's fiscal health. I label this 
change process as malevolent change. Both types of 
discontinuities led to increased inter-group mobility as 
suggested by hypothesis one, thereby, providing support for 
the "environmentalist" school of strategy researchers. 
However, while benevolent change seems to lead to 
increased strategic heterogeneity, malevolent change triggers 
a retraction and strategic homogeneity. Again, the pace of 
adaptation/change is slow for benevolent change, while it is 
rapid and adhoc for malevolent change. This can be seen by the 
fact that it took the industry seven years to achieve maximum 
strategic heterogeneity, reflecting a lagging response pattern 
to the opportunities afforded by deregulation, while it took 
it only two years to achieve a complete withdrawal/retraction 
in the face of LDC debt crises. Finally, it does appear that 
benevolent change encourages autonomous strategic initiatives, 
while malevolent change seems to stifle strategic choice 
initiatives. 
The results do seem to suggest that benevolent change 
encourages more endogenous strategic initiatives in the form 
of innovative and riskier strategies. An unanticipated and 
malevolent environmental change on the other hand, constitutes 
an exogenous shock which has strong impact in altering the 
structure of industry. In other words, it appears that the 
nature of change moderates the relationship between industry 
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structure, environment, and strategic choice. This then 
implies that environmental adaptation, and strategic choice 
perspectives should not be viewed as competing and mutually 
exclusive but as complementary. It appears that both 
perspectives can coexist and provide a richer and more 
accurate description when employed jointly rather than when 
employed separately. 
6.1.3 Impact of Discontinuous Environment on Firm Level 
Risk-Return Relationship 
The second hypothesized impact of environmental 
discontinuity was on the firm level risk-return relationships. 
A negative risk-return relationship was found to exist in the 
banking industry for the entire duration of the study. This 
finding is quite significant. While it adds cumulative 
evidence to the "risk-return paradox" in strategic management 
first uncovered by Armour and Teece (1978) and Bowman (1980), 
its rationale is a little different from existing 
explanations. 
Bowman (1982) suggested that "risk-return paradox" exists 
due to what he called "troubled firms," which, because of 
their poor profitability, had to take large risks to improve 
their situation. On the other hand, Jemison (1987: 1087) noted 
that "risk and return may be tapping two different dimensions 
of performance." While Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1988) explained 
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the paradox by employing a priori concepts from behavioral 
decision theory and prospect theory. 
In their earlier work they (Fiegenbaum 4 Thomas, 1986) 
found that the risk-return paradox was dependent on the time 
period adopted in the study. It was more likely to hold in 
unpredictable and uncertain environments. This was consistent 
with Bowman (I960) who conjectured that regulated, and hence 
stable industries would be more likely to have positive risk- 
return relationships. 
Cool and Schendel (1988) suggested that when 
environmental changes or discontinuities follow each other at 
a quick pace, they may prompt firms to alter their strategic 
behavior. This results in a negative risk-return relationship 
at the firm level which "rests on the assumption that both 
'troubled' and 'successful' firms populate the same strategic 
group* (1988: 218). In their study of the pharmaceutical 
industry, they found a alternating risk return relationship, 
with the first two periods (1962-69 and 1970-74) having a 
positive relationship, while the last two periods (1975-7 9 and 
1980-32) had a negative relationship. However, the beta 
coefficient in the third time period was not significant and 
in the fourth time period it was significant only at 15% level 
of confidence. Nevertheless, they noted that "the fact that 
negative risk-return relationships may persist over a long 
period of time suggests that industries may go through 
sustained phases of disequilibrium" (1988: 220). 
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It is debatable whether the banking industry has been in 
a state of disequilibrium over the entire fifteen period of 
this study. What is more likely is that beyond a certain 
level, negative risk-return relationship is built into the 
very nature of banking. In general, bank products (loans) are 
priced according to a positive risk-return calculus i.e. the 
riskier the loan, the higher the lending interest rate. But 
default on these risky loans can have a very debilitating 
effect on bank performance. Further, since these defaults 
follow a stochastic pattern, they increase the volatility of 
earnings - the variance of returns, thereby generating a 
negative risk-return function. 
6.2 Research Question 2 
What is the nature of the relationship between strategic 
group membership and firm performance? 
Both within and across group performance differences were 
investigated to address this question. I begin by discussing 
the across group differences first. 
A multivariate analysis of variance, showed that 
strategic groups in the banking industry statistically 
differed in their economic performance levels at pc.OOl level 
of significance in all the time periods. Risk differences were 
significant in five out of six time periods, while risk 
adjusted differences were significant only in 1988. These 
findings of economic and risk differences are consistent with 
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Fiegenbaum (1987), but the finding of the risk adjusted 
differences in the last time period is at variance with 
existing research. Cool (1985) found differences only along 
the market share dimension of performance, and no differences 
in risk and risk adjusted levels. 
At least two different explanations may be advanced for 
significant risk adjusted differences in the last time period. 
The first is that these differences may reflect a 
crystallization of industry structure as can seen by looking 
at the differences in the comparative distances between 
cluster centroids of the three core groups in the first and 
last time periods. (See table 6.1 below.) The distance between 
the cluster centroids of the global and diversified regional 
group has increased by 15% over a fifteen year period, the 
distance between diversified regional and tier I regionals has 
increased by 84%, while the distance between the global and 
tier I regionals has reduced by 29%. Overall a pattern of 
homogenization of comparative distances between the cluster 
centroids of the three core groups is noticeable. 
Alternatively, it might be a random phenomenon caused by 
unusually strong performance numbers for the industry in this 
time period as discussed in chapter four. This assertion is 
supported by Dean and Amel's (1991) study which found that 
firm effects are subdued during periods of prosperity, thereby 
translating into lesser within groups variance, and stronger 
across group effects. 
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Table 6.1 Distances between cluster centroids of three 
core strategic groups 
1979 
Global Div. Reg. 
1988 
Global Div. Reg. 
Div. Reg. 38.82 44.72 
Tier 
I Reg. 45.20 17.52 31.88 32.18 
A univariate analysis of performance however shows that 
differences for ROAA were significant in five out of six time 
periods, for PPE on four out of six, and for PE only in one 
time period. Differences on risk exposure in univariate tests 
were "mostly" non-significant. This has two implications: 
First, it suggests the importance of multiple measure 
operationalization and testing of performance. Since some of 
the measures individually (i.e. in the univariate tests) may 
not be significant, but in combination with others (i.e. in 
the MANOVA) they become significant. Only two other studies 
(Cool, 1985; Fiegenbaum, 1987) performed multivariate tests 
and found significant differences on the economic dimension of 
performance. It is tempting therefore, to speculate that over 
reliance on single measures and/or univariate tests may have 
contributed to the inconsistent findings of the previous 
research (e.g. Porter 1979, Oster, 1982, Howell & Howell 1983, 
Dess & Davis 1984). 
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Second, the nonsignificance of financial market measures 
across most time periods may indicate that financial markets 
and analysts focus on individual firms rather than strategic 
groups. This would explain the high standard deviations on the 
PE measure. A similar phenomenon was also reported by Lewis 
and Thomas (1990: 395), who observed that "we find that PER 
varies more within than between groups, suggesting that 
markets and analysts analyze individual firms". 
The finding of differential risk levels across groups 
suggests that Cool and Schendel's (1988) conclusion that risk 
differences exist only at the firm level may be premature. The 
argument for group level risk differences is supported by 
similar empirical findings by Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1990) and 
the theoretical arguments advanced by Caves and Porter (1977), 
to the effect that investments in mobility barriers are 
inherently risky. 
Finally, while Cool and Schendel (1987) found that 
performance differences across groups are not significant in 
periods with lower strategic asymmetry, this study finds 
exactly the opposite i.e., performance differences between 
groups are more significant in periods with lower strategic 
asymmetry. It therefore follows that structural 
characteristics need to be explicitly considered in strategy- 
performance studies, as suggested by Cool & Schendel (1987). 
A longitudinal analysis of performance levels associated 
with each strategic group indicated that the diversified 
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regionals and trust banking group consistently outperformed 
all other groups in the industry. These two strategic groups 
roughly correspond to Porter's cost leadership and focused 
differentiation strategies. This suggests that not all generic 
strategies are equally viable, in the banking industry (Wright 
1984) . A similar result was reported by Cool (1985) , who found 
that a strategy of differentiation was superior to every other 
posture in the pharmaceutical industry. In the present 
context, the global group is the closest in its orientation to 
the differentiation strategy. It is also the group protected 
by the highest mobility barriers, and thus, would be expected 
to outperform every other group in the industry (Caves & 
Porter, 1977). Its inferior performance, therefore, is quite 
surprising. 
At least two different explanations may be advanced for 
this phenomenon. The first is that the underlying commodity 
nature of the product makes it very difficult to create a 
differentiated image, and if created it may be difficult to 
recover the costs of differentiating through premium pricing. 
Differentiation in the banking industry appears to be viable 
only if it is targeted to a particular segment or niche 
(e.g.trust banking). Otherwise, industry economics favor low 
cost producers. 
The second reason for the inferior performance of the 
globals may be differential intra-group rivalry. The 
diversified regionals lack market interpenetration, as their 
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primary markets are pretty well staked out and delineated. 
Globals, on the other hand, have a high degree of market 
interdependence, are intensely rivalrous, and face competition 
from foreign banks and "non-banks". Therefore, the favorable 
protective effects of mobility barriers are competed away by 
high intra-group rivalry. This explanation for "high barriers 
but low performance" syndrome is different from the "mobility 
barriers becoming exit barriers" explanation advanced by 
Mascarenhas and Aaker (198 9) . 
In sum, the presence of economic and risk differences 
across strategic groups means that strategic postures in the 
banking industry vary in their attendant riskiness. But, the 
lack of risk adjusted differences directs our attention to the 
within group performance differences, and hence, to the 
differential set of skills and assets of the firms. 
Differences in performance among firms following similar 
strategies can exist because of at least three reasons. First, 
the differential set of resource endowments of individual 
firms creates a difference between firms in their ability to 
execute their chosen strategy. Second, while all firms in a 
strategic group follow similar strategy, some firms may pursue 
it more vigorously than others (Cool, 1985) . Third, some firms 
may have recently entered the group, and therefore, may be 
adjusting to the new strategy. Whatever the causes, the 
significant within group differences found here, put a burden 
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on future strategic groups research to investigate both within 
and across group performance differences. 
6.3 Research Question 3 
Does the gap between capabilities and strategy account 
for firm performance differences? 
It is now generally recognized at least theoretically, in 
strategy research that firm performance is influenced by a 
host of firm-specific and market-specific factors (Porter, 
1979; Hansen & Wernerfelt 1989) . However, empirical research 
has largely failed to capture the complexity of firm level 
performance determinants, perhaps due to difficulty of 
obtaining data on firm capabilities. This question was 
directed at modeling the firm performance relationship in more 
a complex fashion. It also served as a bridge/transition point 
between research question two and four which explore two 
contrasting models of strategic group formation and attendant 
performance linkages. 
The results showed firm capabilities added significantly 
to the explanation of firm performance on all three dimensions 
of performance - profitability (ROAA), productivity (PPE), and 
ability to generate resources (PE) . The percentage of variance 
explained for 1988 (R2) however, is quite low. As discussed in 
chapter V, this may be attributed to 1988 being an unusually 
profitable year for the industry, resulting in a lot of noise 
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in the relationship. The contribution of strategic group 
membership and firm capabilities is roughly equal. 
This picture changes dramatically if 1990 (a relatively 
normal year) performance figures are used. The overall 
variance explained jumps by about 300% for ROAA, about 70% for 
PPE and about 120% for PE. Interestingly, most of this 
variance is accounted for by firm capabilities. This could 
reflect two things. First it suggests the increasing 
importance of firm capabilities as competitive and rent 
generating weapons in the banking industry. Second, it also 
suggests that strategic group structure in 1990 is likely to 
have changed markedly from 1988, and hence the low R2 for 1988 
strategic group membership when used as a predictor for 1990 
firm performance. This dramatic shift also highlights the 
pitfalls of imputing premature causality based on the results 
of a cross-sectional study. 
These results provide an empirical test of Cool and 
Schendel's (1988) conjecture that performance differences 
within strategic groups may be attributed to differences in 
firm asset endowment. They are also consistent with findings 
of Hansen and Wernerfelt (1989) who using a different research 
design and investigative framework found that both economic 
and organization factors are highly significant predictors of 
firm performance, but that organizational factors explain more 
variance than economic factors. 
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Further, similar to their findings, this study finds that 
strategic group membership and firm capabilities are 
orthogonal and thus independent contributors to firm 
performance. The lack of interaction between these set of 
factors suggests that these two perspectives are supplementary 
rather than complementary as argued by Hansen and Wernerfelt 
(1989) . 
Finally, although the R2 in this study (using 1990 
numbers) is higher than Hansen & Wernerfelt's (1989) 
integrated model (their R2 was .457), a substantial portion of 
the variance in intra industry performance differences is 
still unexplained. This may be explained by looking at 
following hierarchy of performance determinants summarized by 
Porter (1979: 219): 
"The structure within an industry consists of its 
configuration of strategic groups, including their 
mobility barriers, size and composition, strategic 
distance, and market interdependence relative to each 
other. The firm will have higher profits if it is located 
in a group with the best combination of high mobility 
barriers, insulation from intergroup rivalry and 
substitute products, bargaining power with adjacent 
industries, the fewest other members, and suitability to 
the firm's execution ability". 
Thus although strategic group membership and firm 
capabilities are meaningful predictors of firm performance, a 
variety of other factors such as competitive intensity can 
also influence performance. This suggests that future research 
should employ complex models which include multiple predictors 
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to fully capture the multifaceted nature of firm performance 
determinants. 
6.4 Research Question 4 
Are firm resource bundles better predictors of strategic 
group membership than observed product market strategies? 
An analysis of this question involved first identifying 
strategic groups based on key resources, and then comparing 
them with the strategic groups based on positioning 
strategies, in order to ascertain the differences in the group 
membership structure and the relative ability to explain 
performance variation. Such a comparison however is inherently 
limited, since the sample composition and temporal horizon of 
the two designs - the longitudinal one used to identify 
product market strategy based groups, and the cross-sectional 
one used to identify resource based groups, are quite 
different. 
A closer examination reveals that at least two mediating 
factors prevent this comparison from being as flawed as it may 
first appear. First, forty four out of the forty five banks in 
the cross-sectional sample (as pointed out in chapter V, 
Meridian Bancorp, is the only exception) are included in 
longitudinal sample of sixty eight banks. Thus, the cross- 
sectional sample is really a subset of the longitudinal 
sample. Furthermore, the fact that a substantial degree of 
robustness was observed in the underlying strategic group 
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structure of the longitudinal sample when clustering was 
performed on a reduced set of firms, should inspire confidence 
in direct comparison of the two models. 
Second, although data on firm resources was collected in 
the summer of 1991, while the temporal horizon of positioning 
variables does not extend beyond 1988, the fact that firm 
resources are accumulated over a period of time, and hence are 
more durable, should enhance the meaningfulness of contrasting 
the two approaches. Nevertheless, the findings of this 
research question and its associated hypotheses should be 
treated as strictly exploratory, as was pointed in the 
introductory chapter. 
Despite the design limitations, the novelty of this 
approach to operationalizing firm capabilities and its 
significance for future strategic groups research can be 
appreciated by examining the following statement made by 
Collis (1991: 50) in defense of using the case based method 
for an resource based analysis of global bearings industry: 
"While a case study has its drawbacks, at this stage in 
the development of the resource-based analysis of the 
firm it is only appropriate methodology (Montgomery, 
1990) . The need for a fine-grained analysis inside the 
firm prevents a broader sample study, and the lack of 
standardized measures of the important concepts inhibits 
statistical analysis" 
The finding of a substantially higher explanatory power 
of resource based groups as opposed to product-market based 
groups is quite suggestive, and points to a fruitful avenue 
for future research. Combining these results with the 
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theoretical arguments advanced in chapter two, a prima facie 
case appears to exist for employing resource based variables 
as the primary group defining variables in future strategic 
groups studies. 
The presence of J.P. Morgan and Banc One - two banks 
which are generally perceived as having very different banking 
strategies, with Morgan being essentially a wholesale bank and 
Banc One being a retail bank suggests three things: First, it 
appears that may be two levels of competition in an industry; 
the primary level where the firms compete for key input 
resources and the secondary level where they compete for 
customers. This implies that it is possible for a firm to have 
two different set of competitors. For example, Morgan and Banc 
One compete at the primary level for a limited amount of 
banking talent, for capital, for technological expertise etc. 
However, at the secondary level, Morgan probably competes more 
with CitiCorp. for asset growth, while Banc One competes with 
National City or Society Corp. for retail deposits and 
mortgage origination. 
Second, drawing on the distinction between actual 
competition and potential competition from contestability 
theory, it is tempting to speculate that while these two 
players are not actual rivals in the most market segments at 
point in time, this does not preclude them from invading each 
others markets in future. This may be accomplished either 
through direct entry or by buying up each other's competition, 
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given that the fact they are both well endowed with strategic 
resources. In fact, a such phenomenon is already observable in 
the industry, as it continues its relentless move towards 
nationwide banking, with the recent dramatic upturn in the 
merger and consolidation activity. 
Thus, these two banks are potential competitors. It would 
be very fruitful for future research to build a predictive 
model of rivalry based on these resource based groups. For 
instance an interesting question would be whether mergers 
would occur between firms in the same group or across groups, 
and if so between what groups. This would enable us to address 
the theoretical question of whether resource complementerties 
are more important than resource addition, or in other words, 
is there a point beyond which the marginal value of 
accumulating a certain strategic resources is zero. 
Third, it points to the fungibility of certain core 
resources like technological expertise which can be deployed 
in very different fashions. Again, while Morgan uses its high 
degree of technological expertise for developing hedging and 
currency trading programs. Banc One uses its considerable 
technological prowess to maintain efficient back office 
operations, detailed data bases on individual customers, and 
providing real time information to bank employees. 
Finally an careful inspection of figure 5.7 and table 
5.15 illustrate two other important points for the emerging 
resource based view of the firm. First, without 
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scope/positioning variables, it is hard to describe resource 
based groups. The basic nature of the resource based view is 
very inward looking. It makes a fundamental assumption that a 
firm will automatically deploy its resources in the most 
appropriate environments (markets, segments, niches, etc.). 
The strength of assumption remains to be empirically tested. 
For the present, it does appear that some positioning 
variables are required to describe different strategy types. 
Whether positioning variables/strategies are redundant except 
for purely descriptive purposes is question that future 
research needs to address. 
Second, consistent with the theoretical arguments 
advanced in chapter two, a comparison of group two with group 
four shows that of themselves skill have little value, but in 
combination with suitable assets their value enhancing 
potential goes up dramatically. This is illustrated by the 
fact that while both groups two and four are strong on skills 
such as technological expertise, innovation capability, and 
placing power, group two has a stronger capital base and 
higher quality assets, and consequently outperforms group 
four. 
This concludes the discussion of the four research 
questions and the implications of the findings for the 
strategic group research in particular and the strategic 
management research in general. Next, I summarize the findings 
of this study and highlight the theoretical and methodological 
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contributions of this study to the strategic management, and 
its implications for the banking industry. 
CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSIONS 
This study traced the patterns of competition, strategic 
orientations, and the differential risk/return profiles 
associated with various business strategies in the banking 
industry. It addressed the unresolved questions of strategic 
groups existence, stability, and performance effects by 
examining two contrasting models of strategic group 
formation/identification. 
The study found that strategic groups characterized 
competition in the banking industry both before and after 
deregulation. Some support was found for the underlying 
stability of the strategic groups, despite the profound 
changes characterizing the banking industry. Environmental 
discontinuity was found to enhance inter-group mobility and 
strengthen the negative risk-return relationship prevalent in 
this industry. Across group performance differences were found 
on economic and risk dimensions, but not on risk-adjusted 
dimensions except in the last time period. Within group 
performance differences were found, but risk differences 
within groups existed in only 45% of the tests. A model of 
firm performance which included strategic group membership 
along with firm resources was found to have a significantly 
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greater explanatory power than a model which omitted firm 
resources. Finally, resource based groupings appeared to be a 
empirically viable representation of industry rivalry and 
these groups were meaningful predictors of economic 
performance. 
The combination of exogenous discontinuities 
(environment) and endogenous imitation/distancing activities, 
seemed to have functioned as powerful forces in upsetting the 
structural equilibria in the banking industry. This structural 
transformation seems to have quickened with the passage of 
time, due to weakening mobility barriers in the banking 
industry. 
Although given the commodity nature of the underlying 
product, positioning variables do not perhaps constitute 
strong mobility barriers to begin with, the erosion of their 
strength has been facilitated by the development of secondary 
and derivative financial markets. The emergence of these 
markets has created a tremendous degree of 
substitutability/liquidity of the strategic asset investments. 
Therefore, a change in strategy merely requires a change in 
the portfolio mix, given the high degree of factor mobility. 
For example, a bank can sell its mortgage portfolio or its 
credit card portfolio in the secondary markets for asset based 
securities or to quasi-government bodies such as Fannie Mae, 
thereby exiting the consumer loans market. This relative 
flexibility of the asset portfolio makes scope and resource 
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deployment variables to be very fluid dimensions of strategy 
in the banking industry. 
This observation leads one to speculate that for 
financial services industry in particular and for service 
industries in general, strategic groups should be identified 
by using skill based measures which provide more durable 
mobility barriers. Furthermore, the ability of capability 
variables to explain substantial percentage of intra-industry 
performance heterogeneity suggests that the bases of 
competitive advantage for service businesses may be different 
from manufacturing businesses. 
Next I summarize the theoretical and methodological 
contributions of this study for strategic management research 
and its implications for the banking industry. 
7.1 Theoretical and Empirical Contributions to Strategic 
Management Research 
The major contribution of this study lies in extending 
the strategic groups literature by combining it with the 
resource based view of the firm to advance a resource based 
theory of strategic groups and empirically testing this 
proposition by showing these groups indeed do have a strong 
predictive validity. Thus, conceptually it made a case for 
redefining the focus of strategic groups research to include 
resource based variables as primary group defining variables, 
since they are more durable sources of mobility barriers. 
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Second, although tangential to the focus of this study, 
the analysis revealed some interesting implications for the 
resource based view of the firm. Rather than just talking 
about rare, valuable and nonsubsitutable resources, the study 
empirically identified a set of ten key resources in the 
banking industry. Of course, a further a micro level fine 
tuning of each of the individual resource is possible. 
Further, it appears that certain configurations of resources 
are superior to others. Thus, simply being endowed with or 
developing resources which provide competitive advantage is 
not enough, unless they are deployed in suitable combinations. 
This configuration approach may strengthen the resource based 
view in adding to our understanding of intraindustry 
heterogeneity. Additionally, it appears that the implicit 
assumption of appropriate deployment of resources in the most 
suitable product market strategy arenas made by the resource 
based view is not empirically tenable. 
Third, the study proposed and tested a expanded model of 
strategy-performance linkage by including firm resource 
endowments along with strategic group membership to explain 
intra-industry performance heterogeneity. This model acts as 
a sort of bridge or a transition mechanism between the 
traditional product market strategy based conceptualization of 
strategic groups and the alternative resource based theory of 
strategic groups proposed in this study. However, while this 
model does have a higher explanatory power, a substantial 
162 
proportion of the performance variation was still unexplained, 
suggesting that strategic management research needs to move 
away from simplistic notions of performance-strategy linkage. 
Fourth, the study reinforced the findings of earlier 
single industry studies by showing that strategic groups 
characterize competition in two very different competitive 
contexts. Performance differences existed both across and 
within strategic groups, thus confirming that strategic group 
membership does indeed have a linkage with both performance 
and risk, albeit a limited one. Although this was only the 
second study to investigate both within and across group 
differences, it does seem that it is time to close the debate 
on the predictive validity of strategic groups by recognizing 
that strategic groups is not an redundant phenomenon. 
Performance differences can exist both across and within 
groups, with extent of these differences being moderated by 
the structural context of the industry. 
Fifth, it was shown that risk differences can exist at 
both the group and firm level, as opposed to Cool and 
Schendel's (1988) assertion that they exist only at the firm 
level. It was argued that this conclusion may be premature. 
Theoretical arguments were made to back the empirical 
findings. Thus, for a fuller understanding of the strategy- 
performance relationship, future research should investigate 
risk differences at both group and the firm level. 
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Sixth, it added to the growing body of empirical research 
in strategic management (Bowman, 1980/ Fiegenbaum & Thomas 
1986 etc.) on risk-return paradox by showing that negative 
risk-return function can exist in certain industries due to 
the structural nature of these industries. This is at variance 
with the explanations of instability (Bowman, 1980) and 
prospect theory (Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1986), advanced in the 
existing research. 
Finally, the study showed that discontinuous change has 
a profound effect on industry structure and risk-return 
calculus, but that the relationship between environment and 
strategy is moderated by the nature of change itself. Research 
on strategic change is concerned with understanding both the 
content/magnitude and the process of change (Ginsberg, 1988), 
or delineating the differences between strategic change and 
strategic adjustment (Snow & Hambrick, 1980) . Previous 
research has largely focused on investigating the role of 
strategic choice, environmental adaptation, or population 
ecology perspectives in accounting for strategic change 
(Mascarenhas, 1989) without looking at the type of change 
itself. This study extended this stream of literature by 
adding a new dimension to it. 
7.2 Methodological Contributions 
The resource based view of the firm is gaining increasing 
prominence in strategic management research. Ghoshal and 
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Bartlett (1991) have referred to it as a exciting new paradigm 
which has the potential to pull diverse strands of strategy 
research under a unifying umbrella. However, a critical 
impediment in the development of this view has been the 
difficulty encountered in operationalizing firm levels 
skills/capabilities and testing their significance in a 
positivist framework. This study develops and tests a novel 
approach to resolve the knotty issue of measuring firm level 
skills that is compatible with large sample research. 
Second, while multiple measures of performance have been 
used in some of the recent strategic groups studies (Cool & 
Schendel, 1987/ Fiegenbaum & Thomas 1990/ Lewis & Thomas 1991) 
measurement of strategic (i.e. firms' long term health and 
adaptation capability) as opposed to economic performance 
(historical picture) is a novelty in this research stream. 
Third, this is the first longitudinal strategic groups 
study which employed market based measures of performance 
along with accounting based measures to comprehensively test 
the strategy-performance linkage. 
Fourth, since the correct identification of strategic 
groups is critically dependent on the underlying clustering 
algorithm, this study employed a more robust two stage 
clustering algorithm, which overcomes the methodological 
weaknesses of hierarchical clustering. The benefit of this 
approach can be seen by the fact that in the last two time 
periods, second stage clustering reduced the number of 
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clusters by one in each case. Further, multiple methods (scree 
tests, discriminant analysis, MANOVA, and sensitivity 
analysis) were employed to identify the correct number of 
clusters. 
Finally, the explicit involvement of industry experts at 
each phase of this study, led to a grounded and rigorous 
variable specification. Again, the corroboration of 
statistically derived sub-periods with significant industry 
events is a first in this research stream and should 
substantially enhance the validity of the findings. 
7.3 Implications for the Banking Industry 
The primary import of this theses for bankers is the 
need to shift their strategic focus from privileged product 
market positions as basis for competitive advantage to the 
creating, nurturing, and sustaining key resources to enhance 
their long term competitive health. A list of ten such 
resources was identified in this study. This shift in focus 
also calls for supplementing their existing mental models of 
competition to include competitors in the primary market for 
resource accumulation, who are often not their competitors in 
product markets. 
Another implication is that risk management is a core 
skill in the banking industry. Simply investing in state-of- 
art technological systems and financial engineering 
departments/products, will not be effective unless management 
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has the depth and the vision to properly deploy these 
resources. Along with management quality, asset quality and a 
strong capital base are also very important in creating long 
term sustainable competitive advantage. 
Finally, it appears that the strategic logic of this 
industry favors either low cost producers or highly focused 
competitors. Rewards from following a differentiated strategic 
posture are not commensurate with the incremental costs 
associated with going down that route. This suggests that 
management should focus on lowering its fixed cost base, 
uncovering hidden cross-subsidization among product lines, 
dropping non-viable products from the portfolio, and in 
general attending to cost control on an ongoing basis. 
This is exemplified by the following observation about 
Cincinnati based highly successful Fifth Third Bancorp.: "The 
focus has been on efficiency and productivity; they count 
paper clips and figure customers don't care if there are no 
original oil paintings on the walls." (Wall Street Journal, 
1992) . For the present and in the near term, it does seem that 
"back to the basics" strategy is a clear winner in this 
industry. This situation may change, however as the industry 
consolidates and enters into some kind of long term dynamic 
equilibrium. 
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APPENDIX: RATING SHEET 
Bank Name Rater Code 
1) 
i 
Management Quality and Depth 
1 
Low 
1 1 1 r 
Average 
1 1 
High 
2) 
1 
Franchise 
i i i i 1 
Low 
1 1 1 1 
Average 
1 1 
High 
3) 
i 
Asset/Credit Quality 
i i i i. i i 1 
Low 
1 1 1 1 
Average 
1 1 
High 
4) 
i 
Technological Expertise 
i i i i. i i 1 
Low 
1 1 1 1 
Average 
1 1 
High 
5) 
i _ 
Placing Power 
i i i i ■ i i 1 
Low 
1 1 1 1 
Average 
1 1 
High 
6) 
1 
Adequacy of Capital Base 
i i i i ■ i i 1 
Low 
1 1 1 1 
Average 
1 1 
High 
7) 
I 
Resource Management/Efficiency 
1 
Low 
lilt 
Average 
1 1 
High 
8) 
1 
Innovation 
1 
Low 
1 1 1 1 
Average 
1 l 
High 
9) Risk Management 
1 
Low 
1 1 l I 
Average High 
10) Information Advantage/Asymmetry 
1 
Low Average High 
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